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ABSTRACT 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) will transform many aspects of 
traditional telephony service, including the technology, the business models, 
and the regulatory constructs that govern such service.  Perhaps not 
unexpectedly, this transformation is generating a host of technical, business, 
social, and policy problems.  In attempting to respond to these problems, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could mandate obligations or 
specific solutions to VoIP policy issues; however, it is instead looking first 
to industry initiatives focused on the key functionality that users have come 
to expect of telecommunications services.  High among this list of desired 
functionality is user access to emergency services for purposes of 
summoning fire, medical, and law enforcement agencies.  Such services 
were traditionally required to be implemented (and subsequently were 
implemented) through state and federal regulations. 
 
An emergency service capability is a critical social concern, making 
it particularly important for the industry to propose viable solutions for 
promoting VoIP emergency services before regulators are compelled to 
mandate a solution.  Reproducing emergency services in the VoIP space has 
proven to be a considerable task, mainly due to the wide and diverse variety 
of VoIP implementations and implementers.  While technical and business 
communities have, in fact, made considerable progress in this area, 
significant uncertainty and deployment problems still exist.  
 
The question we ask is this: Can an industry-based certification and 
labeling process credibly address social and policy expectations regarding 
emergency services and VoIP, thus avoiding the need for government 
regulation at this critical time?1 We hypothesize that the answer is “yes.”  
In answering this question, we developed a model for VoIP emergency 
service compliance through industry certification and device labeling.  This 
model is intended to support a wide range of emergency service 
implementations while providing users with sufficient verification that the 
service will operate as anticipated.  To this end, we first examine possible 
technical implementations for VoIP emergency services.2 Next, we 
summarize the theory of certification as self-regulation and examine several 
relevant examples.  Finally, we synthesize a specific model for certification 
 
1 We would like to acknowledge and thank the NET Institute (http://www.NETinst.org) for supporting this 
project. 
2 Note that we use the term “emergency services” for VoIP rather than specifying it as E911 for VoIP.  We 
make this distinction in order to distinguish between the technology of traditional emergency services carried over 
the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) versus those services carried over IP and to emphasize that 
emergency services in the IP space might be very different from traditional E911 in terms of function. 
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of VoIP emergency services. We believe that the model we describe 
provides both short-term and long-term opportunities.  In the short term, an 
industry-driven effort to solve the current problem of VoIP emergency 
services, if properly structured and overseen as we suggest, should be both 
effective and efficient.  In the long term, such a process can serve as a self-
regulatory model that can be applied to social policy goals in the 
telecommunications industry, making it an important tool to have as the 
industry becomes increasingly diverse and heterogeneous. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
VoIP promises to upend a century-old model of voice telephony by 
creating a more dynamic marketplace and by changing the point of control 
from the central office switch to the end user’s device.  The transformation 
to VoIP is only in its very early stages, and it will ultimately impact all 
sectors of the telecommunications services industry, including traditional 
incumbent local exchange carriers, cable providers, wireless service 
providers, and emergency service providers.  In fact, all of the relevant 
stakeholders affected by VoIP (e.g., service providers, hardware and 
software vendors, customers, and governmental agencies) share a great need 
to analyze the issues raised by the transition from the traditional Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to a packet-switched, Internet 
Protocol (IP)-based architecture.  For example, service providers and 
hardware and software developers are struggling to understand and take 
advantage of opportunities in this area involving new technology prospects 
(e.g., integrated messaging and mobile collaboration).  Moreover, business, 
governmental, and residential consumer users of telecommunications 
equipment and services are seeking guidance on when and how to upgrade 
to a new technological frontier.  Finally, governmental agencies are 
struggling to ensure that social policy concerns will be addressed in this 
very different technological environment. 
 
The social policy implications of VoIP present regulators and 
incumbent businesses with an unusual dilemma, forcing them to choose 
from amongst mutually exclusive—and equally unfavorable—options.  
Under the current PSTN-based voice telephone network, many critical 
policy goals, such as the provision of reliable emergency services, are 
implemented effectively and reliably.  However, most VoIP services, at least 
as they exist today, do not deliver the same level of quality and 
dependability as emergency services.  In response, some state regulators 
have considered passing regulations requiring VoIP to meet legacy (and 
other) requirements, regardless of the dramatic differences in the VoIP 
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services technical and business models.3 The FCC has only begun to 
develop its regulatory VoIP strategy, although former Chairman Michael 
Powell had made it clear that the strategy would need to differ from the 
legacy model used in the PSTN context, a position likely to continue in 
successor FCC administrations.4 With these thoughts in mind, it is unclear 
how VoIP services might evolve in a meaningful and timely fashion.   
 
In a number of specific circumstances, however, self-regulation can 
be a viable alternative to government regulation.  Certification, in particular, 
can be provided by a self-regulatory body as evidence of conformance to 
required attributes, practices, or policies.  Self-regulation has a number of 
potential advantages, and in the case of VoIP emergency services we are 
particularly interested in recognizing information asymmetries between 
industry and government, given the increase in complexity and 
heterogeneity inherent in the move from PSTN to VoIP.  In order for self-
regulation to be viewed as a credible alternative and in order for it to 
ultimately succeed, it needs to be situated within a careful institutional 
framework that includes (1) a clear and consistent external motivation (e.g., 
an incentive in terms of third-party liability), (2) a process for determining 
the specifications to be certified, (3) identification of certifiers and 
determination if a competitive market for certification exists, (4) reference 
to an appropriately neutral accrediting party (a role that government can but 
does not have to fill), (5) communication of certification to users, and 
(6) policing of certification.  The telecommunications industry has 
repeatedly demonstrated the ability to self-regulate in areas of 
interoperability where economic motivation can be relied on to incentivize 
the activity.  In this case, though, we propose that the industry self-regulate 
in order to address a social policy goal.  Success in this area could even help 
self-regulation become a tool that could be applied in other areas of social 
policy (especially in the development of new policy initiatives that would 
otherwise be imposed through government regulation of 
telecommunications, as has traditionally been the case). 
 
The particular technical challenges surrounding VoIP emergency 
services arise from two major drivers: variability and location.  VoIP can be 
 
3 Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2003). Note that 
newer service providers have already started to tell consumers that VoIP services may not meet traditional E911 
expectations, although they have not yet described what the alternative expectations might be. For example, an 
AT&T spokesperson, referring to the company’s consumer VoIP service, indicates, “We make very clear to our 
customers that our CallVantage Internet phone service does not work the same as traditional landline 911.” 911 
Calls Made Over Internet Often Get Lower Priority, USA TODAY, October 12, 2004, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-10-12-voip-trouble_x.htm.   
4 Written statement of Michael K. Powell on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), February 24, 2004, 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-244231A1.pdf. 
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seen as a much more variable service than traditional PSTN-based 
telephony, and many new business models and technical combinations are 
emerging in which quality, methods of initiating and terminating calls, 
integration with other messaging technologies,5 and types of terminals (e.g.,
phones, PDAs, and PCs) have all become heterogeneous.  For emergency 
services in particular, IP networks are fundamentally location independent, 
and VoIP services may run on IP networks over many different types of 
wired and wireless access.6 As a result, these realities challenge a 
fundamental modern expectation—that an emergency services dispatcher 
can identify the caller’s location even if the caller does not know the 
location or is not able to describe it.  Although substantial technical progress 
is being made regarding the provision of emergency services in various 
VoIP settings, users may not be able to determine prior to an emergency 
whether the particular service they are employing is emergency service 
capable.  Accordingly, we propose to use labeling as a means of specifying 
the particular level of emergency service capability provided, in recognition 
of the fact that VoIP’s diversity will preclude a single common requirement 
for all possible VoIP services.  We also propose that an emergency service 
testing capability be made available to the end user.  
 
In this paper, we will describe the technical issues surrounding 
emergency service in VoIP, examine the status of proposed technical 
strategies,7 and identify candidate criteria to be used in certification.  
Furthermore, we will examine the theories behind and examples of 
successful certification within self-regulatory regimes, including (1) the use 
of certification in product safety, (2) the use of certification in particular by 
Underwriters Laboratories acting as certifying institutions, (3) ISO 9000 
quality system certification, (4) interoperability certification within the 
telecommunications industry through Cable Television Laboratories and 
 
5 Indeed, we should ask to what extent social policy expectations of emergency services response to voice 
communications should also apply to the many other modes of communication that are now popular or that may 
become popular, such as email, instant messaging, and video telephony.  Given the possible breadth of regulation 
implied by such an increase in scope, we submit that the option of effective self-regulation would be even more 
valuable for all of these services than for telephony emergency services alone. 
6 For example, VoIP is increasingly carried over Wi-Fi wireless local access networks, and dual-mode 
phones that can switch between VoIP/Wi-Fi and cellular service are now being marketed.  See Corie Lok, One 
Person, One Phone, TECH. REV., March 2004, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/
print_version/innovation10304.asp, and Marguerite Reardon, Wi-Fi and VoIP: Is Sum Greater Than Parts, 
CNET.COM, March 1, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2102-7352_3-5167782.html.
7 VoIP has a number of different signaling frameworks, including the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and 
H.323.  For the most part, we attempt to proceed in a framework-independent manner in this paper; however, in 
cases where the framework is relevant, we focus on the SIP framework.  We fully acknowledge that development 
of actual certification standards will need to consider multiple frameworks.  Our emphasis on SIP is motivated by 
technical, market, and policy issues that are outside the scope of this paper. See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet 
Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 2003, at G3 (explaining in basic terms how a SIP 
phone works). For a good overview of SIP, see generally the SIP Working Group homepage on the Internet 
Engineering Task Force website, available at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/sip-charter.html.
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Telcordia, (5) the Wi-Fi Alliance as a consumer-oriented certification 
consortium, and (6) general experience with self-regulation in 
environmental policy.  In the end, we will synthesize these insights in order 
to propose specific recommendations on institutional design, technical 
criteria, and the certification process. 
 
II. EXISTING MODELS FOR CERTIFICATION 
In this section, we will share the results of secondary research into 
existing certification processes.  Drawing on historical analysis and 
literature review techniques, this research incorporates the collection and 
analysis of original descriptions, outcomes research on certification 
processes, and research on the manner in which these processes have been 
embedded in overall policy systems including government regulation. In the 
end, we will offer an overall model for successful certification tailored to 
the particular technical and industrial circumstances of VoIP. 
 
A.  Theory and Practice of Certification 
 
Well-established certification processes are used in professions such 
as medicine and law to accredit practitioners, in securities markets by 
underwriters and auditors, and in product safety and compatibility arenas.  
More recently, certification and, more broadly, self-regulation have emerged 
in new social policy settings (e.g., the certification of a manufacturer’s 
compliance with labor practice expectations in developing countries or with 
specific environmental practices).  Substantial research has created a 
reasonable understanding of the purpose of certification, as well as of its 
challenges and drawbacks. 
 
Certification can have both economic and social policy goals.  In 
economic terms, products or services may have attributes (such as quality or 
safeness) that buyers have difficulty ascertaining prior to the purchase.  As a 
result, consumers oftentimes cannot distinguish between products, a 
situation that leaves little incentive for companies to include the attributes in 
the first place.  Although reputation (brand) and warranties may mitigate 
this effect, such factors fall short if they are inconsistent or if customers find 
it too difficult or costly to apply the factors as a recourse. Certification can 
thus provide an alternate method for reliably signaling attribute 
distinctions.8 For social policy, certification (as an aspect of self-regulation) 
can serve as an alternative or complement to government regulation.  In 
 
8 Gian Luigi Albano & Alessandro Lizzeri, Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality, 42 INT’L ECON.
REV. 1, 267-283 (2001). 
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other words, certification can be used as a means of avoiding the 
overproduction of negative social externalities (e.g., pollution) and the 
underproduction of positive social externalities (e.g., safety policies). 
 
Moreover, certification can offer important advantages over direct 
“command-and-control” regulation.  For example, certification can reduce 
the demand on government services and, consequently, on required levels of 
taxation (or, put another way, certification can better accommodate a neo-
liberal reduced-government capability).  It can also exploit information 
asymmetries in which industry participants have more (and better) 
information than a potential government regulator.9 The direct use of 
industry information may increase the rate at which regulation can adapt as 
circumstances change and may also subsequently reduce the need to 
enumerate all conceivable contingencies, resulting in more flexible and 
lighter-weight regulation.10 Furthermore, preemptive self-regulation may 
eliminate the need for industries and their opponents to make politically 
motivated investments in regulatory policies.11 
Self-regulation can also have a moral and cultural effect by 
inculcating an ethical component in institutional self-image that induces 
behavior that exceeds mere compliance with the letter of the law.12 
Conversely, imposition of rigid regulation instead of self-regulation on 
sectors that have a strong anti-authoritarian tradition can, as commentator 
Darren Sinclair notes, “destroy virtue in the business community.”13 We 
believe that it is far too early to suggest that the telecommunications 
industry is incapable of producing its own solutions. 
 
9 Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 6, 1328-1346 (1979) [hereinafter: Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing]. 
10 Christodoulos Stefanadis, Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial Industry, 23 J. REG. ECON. 1, 
5-25 (2003). 
11 In this case, the end result is a Pareto improvement in welfare. See John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon, & 
Steven C. Hackett, Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 
43 J. LAW & ECON. 583 (2000) [hereinafter: Maxwell, et. al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare].  Also see THE 
ECONOMIST’S Research Tools, available at http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/, which defines 
Pareto efficiency as follows: 
A situation in which nobody can be made better off without making somebody else worse off. 
Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1843–1923), an Italian economist. If an economy’s resources are 
being used inefficiently, it ought to be possible to make somebody better off without anybody 
else becoming worse off. In reality, change often produces losers as well as winners. Pareto 
efficiency does not help judge whether this sort of change is economically good or bad. 
12 Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation 
of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment, 19 LAW & POL’Y 4, 415-443  (1997), and Simon Ashby, 
Swee-Hoon Chuah, & Robert Hoffmann, Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic 
Voluntary Compliance, 11 INT’L J. OF THE ECONOMICS OF BUS. 1, 91-106 (2004) [hereinafter: Ashby, et. al.,
Industry Self-Regulation]. 
13 Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control?  Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW &
POL’Y 4, 529-559 (1997) [hereinafter: Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control]. 
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On the other hand, certification can have undesirable side effects 
that should be anticipated in institutional design.  If certifiers are under the 
control of the body being certified, certification may be deliberately 
structured to restrict new entrants and extract monopoly rents for already 
certified parties,14 an attribute of guilds that continues in contemporary 
professions that require certification.15 A parallel social policy concern 
relates to the credibility of the certifier, who may be perceived as being too 
tightly controlled by the certifying body.16 
Ironically, though, should certification preempt some other form of 
regulation and succeed in spurring innovation and even new entrants, it is 
quite possible that incumbents would view the previous form of regulation 
as preferable even though a broader social perspective would favor 
certification.  For this reason, we cannot conclude with assurance that all 
industry players will prefer certification even if it benefits both industry as a 
whole and society at large. 
 
If the certification capability is limited to a single or small number 
of suppliers of certifications, the certification process itself might capture 
monopoly rents to the detriment of suppliers or consumers.  More generally, 
even a competitive certifier market can exhibit peculiarities depending on 
the level of certifier liability, the regulation of the certifier market, and the 
amount of competition17 (e.g., situations in which certifiers do not provide 
all information or choose to provide noisy information).18 The structure of 
the certifier market is consequently a non-trivial consideration. 
 
14 Id., at 38.  Leland provides a more nuanced analysis of whether licensing results in standards that are too 
high in order to restrict competition: “If a professional group or industry is allowed to set minimum quality 
standards (self-regulation), these standards may be set too high or too low.  On balance, however, there is some 
reason to expect too-high standards will be the more likely case.” Leland, Quacks, Lemons and Licensing, cited 
supra at note 9, at 1342.  See also Ulrike Schaede, Industry Rules: From Deregulation to Self-Regulation, 28 THE 
JAPANESE ECONOMY 6, 35-58 (2000). Schaede points out a related problem in which apparent deregulation in 
Japan, replaced by industry self-regulation, did little to weaken trade barriers. 
15 Bernardo Bortolotti & Gianluca Fiorentini, Barriers to Entry and the Self-Regulating Professions: 
Evidence from the Market for Italian Accountants, in BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI & GIANLUCA FIORENTINI, EDS., 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION (OXFORD, UK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999), at 131-157; 
and Roger Van Den Bergh, Self-Regulation of the Medical and Legal Professions: Remaining Barriers to 
Competition and EC Law, IN BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI & GIANLUCA FIORENTINI, EDS., ORGANIZED INTERESTS 
AND SELF-REGULATION (OXFORD, UK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999), at 89-130. 
16 In social policy regulation, critics are quick to question the extent to which firms and industries will truly 
restrict themselves, notwithstanding their stated intentions. To some extent, this debate rests on questions as to 
whether firms optimize shareholder wealth or take a stakeholder perspective. See Javier Núñez, A Model of Self-
Regulation, ECONOMICS LETTERS 74, 91-97 (2001), and Maxwell, et. al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare, 
cited supra at note 11, at 52. 
17 Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Imperfect Competition in Certification Markets, in BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI &
GIANLUCA FIORENTINI, EDS., ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), at 158-176. 
18 Id., at 37. 
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The insurance industry plays a special role in certification as well, 
especially since certification may signal lower insurance risks, which may 
then be reflected in lower premiums. Not unexpectedly, insurers need to be 
able to rely on certifiers’ independence from producers.  For example, 
certifiers that vigorously compete for producer business may compromise 
the accuracy of certification (witness recent auditing scandals).19 
Closely related to the role of insurance in certification is the role of 
liability.  Liability, of course, already works in partnership with regulation 
when safety issues come into play, for neither liability nor regulation by 
itself is generally sufficient to produce socially desirable levels of care.20 
From a producer’s perspective, then, self-regulation that results in an active 
compliance activity may provide protection against imputation of “intent” 
to undertake unlawful acts.21 In product liability, for example, a showing of 
negligence usually requires all of the following elements to exist and 
requires all of the associated questions to be answered in the positive: 
(1) duty (did the vendor use “reasonable care”?), (2) breach of duty (was 
there unreasonable conduct involving an act or a failure to act?), 
(3) foreseeability (was the problem foreseeable?), (4) proximate cause (did 
the breach cause the damage?), and (5) damage (did the conduct cause 
physical injury or some other loss?).  A widely accepted industry 
certification or a government-endorsed certification, along with a vendor’s 
consistent effort in securing such certification, can aid a defense on 
questions of duty and breach of duty. 
 
A critical question in self-regulation is the appropriate role of 
government.  Pure self-regulation (i.e., regulation without any external 
influence) is usually rejected based on the lack of evidence showing that 
this mode naturally arises or is effective.22 Conversely, a broad correlation 
between evidence of governmental incentives for the creation of self-
regulation and self-regulatory activity23 seems to suggest that successful and 
credible self-regulation is consistently coupled with some form of influence 
 
19 As another example, periodic softness in the market for maritime insurance leads to lax responses to 
negative certification signals from insurers. See Frank Furger, Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: 
The Case of the Maritime Industry, 19 LAW & POL’Y 4, 445-476 (1997). 
20 Steven Shavell, A Model for the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 2, at 
271-280 (Summer 1984). 
21 See also John C. Ruhnka & Heidi Boerstler, Governmental Incentives for Corporate Self-Regulation, 17 J. 
BUS. ETHICS (1998), 1309-326 (1998) [hereinafter: Ruhnka & Boerstler, Governmental Incentives] (analogizing 
self-regulation to certain consequences that can be found in criminal antitrust cases). 
22 Id., at 41-42, 45.  See also Jorge Rivera & Peter de Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environmental 
Performance of Western Ski Areas, 32 THE POL’Y STUDIES J. 3. 417-437 (2004) (noting that, absent oversight, a 
firm that joins a self-regulatory body may actually have a tendency to underperform when compared with firms 
that do not join, thus effectively deriving membership benefits without actually investing in the area subject to 
self-regulation). 
23 Id., at 51.  
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or oversight, leading to a model that might be described as co-regulation.24 
Such external influences may come from government entities or, as is 
apparent in certain contemporary social policy cases, independent non-
governmental organizations with political influence or influence over 
consumer choice.25 When influencing the formation of self-regulatory 
bodies, the government’s manner of signaling its intentions can be 
important.  In fact, game theory suggests that the government should firmly 
demonstrate zero tolerance of undesirable behavior and immediately invoke 
direct regulation if such behavior is observed.26 On a more positive note, 
the government can also encourage self-regulation through a variety of 
positive signals regarding preferential treatment for diligent self-
regulators.27 
Three processes that are commonly present in social regulation are 
also potentially applicable to co-regulation. These three processes are as 
follows: (1) prior approval, in which firms obtain approval before engaging 
in an activity; (2) mandatory standards, in which firms are required to 
comply with the regulation and undergo monitoring; and (3) information 
disclosure, in which firms are required to disclose facts to buyers that they 
might not otherwise choose to disclose.28 Interestingly, the framework by 
which self-regulation is invoked can also result in unanticipated effects.  For 
 
24 Id., at 54. As Sinclair points out, the tendency in some of the literature to paint command-and-control 
regulation and self-regulation as stark and distinct alternatives is overly restrictive: “Those who are locked into a 
paradigm which incorrectly assumes that choices have to be made between artificially restrictive models of self-
regulation and command and control regulation are unlikely to be capable of appreciating the more nuanced 
opportunities for achieving both efficiency and effectiveness, which arise from complementary combination of 
both types of instruments.” Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control, cited supra at note 13, at 532. 
Sinclair goes on to list the following four key components, which can be modulated to select a policy on the 
spectrum between command and control and self-regulation (these components are quoted verbatim) (emphasis in 
the original): 
the nature and extent of regulatory compulsion;
the extent to which regulatory flexibility allows firms to accommodate their individual 
circumstances; 
the opportunity for industry design input into the negotiation and development of regulation; and 
the extent to which win-win outcomes are the focus of regulation. 
The legal and regulatory incentives used to influence self-regulation have traditionally been (and often continue to 
be) primarily “punitive” in nature, though some more recent cases are shifting towards positive incentives that 
reward corporations for actions that encourage or assist desirable behavior. See Ruhnka & Boerstler, 
Governmental Incentives, cited supra at note 21.  
25 Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and 
Monitoring, 31 THE POL’Y STUDIES J. 1, 1-28 (2003), and Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, 
Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POLITICS &
SOCIETY 3, 433-464 (September 2003). 
26 See Ashby, et. al., Industry Self-Regulation, cited supra at note 12. 
27 Ruhnka & Boerstler give as examples recognition of compliance with self-regulation as a mitigating factor 
for corporate regulatory violations by regulating agencies, by state and federal prosecutors, and in jury 
instructions and sentencing guidelines; recognition of self-reporting as a mitigating factor by prosecutors and 
regulators; and substitution of internal compliance for agency monitoring. Ruhnka & Boerstler, Governmental 
Incentives, cited supra at note 21. 
28 A. Ogus, Regulatory Institutions and Structures, 73 ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS,
4, 627-648 (2002). 
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example, a government-crafted “voluntary agreement” may reduce industry 
efforts to engage in industry-devised self-regulatory activities, reducing 
profits and, thus, general welfare.29 This point again suggests that 
government should apply credible pressure in order to motivate self-
regulatory activity, while also exploiting the potential advantages of self-
regulation, particularly information asymmetries between industry and 
government. 
 
On a related note, another necessary element for the industrial self-
regulatory component is coherent industry representation.30 Possibilities 
include standards bodies, industry associations, and the consortia 
increasingly evident in the information and communication technology 
industries, although care must be taken, especially in the latter case, to 
mitigate the potential for exclusion and reduced competition.31 
On a final note, software, an increasingly important product and 
component, differs greatly from many of the other types of products that 
have traditionally been certified.32 Because software can directly affect 
safety, software reliability is increasingly scrutinized.  Certification thus can 
serve the dual economic purposes of signaling quality to users and reducing 
the liability of producers.33 Software often has an iterative and incremental 
design character, so delaying certification testing until the completion of 
software implementation can be quite inefficient.  Consequently, 
certification testing is better introduced as an integral part of the internal 
and regression-testing stages of software design.34 Interestingly, an 
organization that embeds certification testing throughout the design cycle 
can inculcate a culture in which the criteria used for certification become 
implicit organizational values (e.g., by embedding security certification 
testing, an organization can help foster a “security culture”).35 However, 
implementation of broad software certification processes poses significant 
challenges.  For instance, an organization may find it infeasible to maintain 
 
29 Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Self-Regulation, Taxation, and Public Voluntary Environmental 
Agreements, 87 J. PUBLIC ECON, 1453-1486 (2003). 
30 Id., at 42. 
31 Richard Hawkins, The Rise of Consortia in the Information and Communication Technology Industries: 
Emerging Implications for Policy, 23 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1999), at 159-173. 
32 It is worth noting that software has been subject to certification in a number of areas, including most 
notably in the area of security.  The US government developed a set of security certification techniques referred to 
as the Orange Book. 
33 It should be noted that producers of software already have a history of limiting liability through the terms 
of software licenses.  In light of this fact, some advocate an insurance-industry-driven certification regime akin to 
Underwriters Laboratory-style safety certification.  Harold W. Lawson, Infrastructure Risk Reduction, 41 
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 6, June 1998, at 120. 
34 Patricia Rodriguez-Dapena, Software Safety Certification: A Multidomain Problem, IEEE SOFTWARE,
July-August 1999, at 31-38. 
35 Greg Goth, Will the Cyber-UL Concept Take Hold? IEEE SOFTWARE, July/August 2002, at 12-15. 
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adequate criteria to certify products that change rapidly in function and 
capability.  In such cases, certification may be practical only if it is 
restricted to aspects of the system that undergo fewer changes and that can 
be reasonably isolated.  Moreover, different types of certification give rise 
to different challenges.  Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane Internet 
Security, Inc., a managed security company in San Jose, California, points 
out that certifying for security—where threats are active, intelligent, and 
hostile—is more challenging than certifying for safety—where threats are 
usually passive and random.36 
B.  Certification Examples 
 
1. Underwriters Laboratories and Product Safety Certification 
 
Underwriters Laboratories (UL), incorporated as a non-profit 
organization in 1901, was initially funded by the National Board of Fire 
Underwriters to prepare lists of safe products, thus demonstrating the 
potential benefits derived from linking certification to insurance.37 When 
insurance industry funding ceased in 1916, UL became a self-sustaining 
organization through the collection of testing fees.  Today, manufacturers 
are motivated to seek UL certification because (1) some customers require 
it, (2) many consumers recognize it as an indicator of product safety, and 
(3) it can reduce manufacturer liability by supporting reasonable care 
claims. 
 
Safety co-regulation by government agencies and an industry 
certifier—Underwriters Laboratories—is apparent in two distinct models.  
On the one hand, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) sanctions Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories through an 
explicit accreditation process.38 (Whereas UL was originally the only such 
lab, now it is but one of several.)39 OSHA regulations thus compel 
manufacturers to produce and buy certified products from accredited 
 
36 Scott Berinato, A UL-Type Seal for Security? Don’t Bet on It, EWEEK, October 16, 2000, at 11-12. 
37 For a brief but interesting history of Underwriters Laboratories, see Harry Chase Brearly, A Symbol of 
Safety: The Origins of Underwriters Laboratories, in DANIEL B. KLEIN, ED., REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE 
VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT (ANN ARBOR, MI: THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS, 1997), 
at 75-84. 
38 Accreditation fees for test laboratories are on the order of $10,000.  See U.S. Department of Labor, 
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories; Fees; Reduction of Public Comment Period on Recognition Notices, 
Federal Register Number 64:45098-45114, August 18, 1999, available at http://tinyurl.com/3nl4o.
39 OSHA’s decision in 1988 to create a competitive market for testing could not be the result of a strict profit 
motive on the part of UL, because UL is a non-profit organization.  However, absent the discipline of competition, 
even a non-profit organization may not evolve or diligently pursue efficiency initiatives.  Current UL management 
is undertaking a major effort to modernize and increase efficiency in the organization.  See the 2003 UL Annual 
Report, Underwriters Laboratory website, available at http://www.ul.com/info/UL_AR_2003.pdf. See also Brett 
Nelson, Under Fire, FORBES, June 21, 2004.  
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laboratories.  The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),40 on the 
other hand, has a less formal relationship with UL.  The CPSC actively 
contributes to the content of UL standards in cases where the CPSC has a 
direct interest.41 In other cases, the CPSC may use public feedback as a 
mechanism for influencing UL practices.42 UL, for its part, actively invests 
in the government and regulator services it offers.  For example, UL makes 
its information and consulting services available only to regulators.43 
2. Telecommunications Certification: CableLabs and Telcordia 
 
Historically, most U.S. social policy goals have been advanced 
through governmental regulation rather than through self- or co-regulation.  
In fact, for decades antitrust laws in the United States have provided a 
significant deterrent to industry development of common standards.  
European and other international companies, on the other hand, have a 
long-standing tradition of working together to form common solutions.  In 
1984, Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in 
recognition of the fact that U.S. industry can benefit through participation in 
collaborative standards-setting activities.44 Accordingly, the 
telecommunications industry has only a very recent history of group 
 
40 See the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission website, available at http://www.cpsc.gov. 
41 The CPSC also participates in defining standards of other “voluntary” safety standards-setting 
organizations, such as ASTM International (http://www.astm.org).  Further, the CPSC has the authority to directly 
regulate in cases where it sees sufficient safety risk by “issuing and enforcing mandatory standards or banning 
consumer products if no feasible standard would adequately protect the public.” Id. 
42 Underwriters Laboratories Has Been Coming Under Fire, CONSUMERS RESEARCH, January 2000, at 
40-41. 
43 See Regulatory Authorities, Underwriters Laboratories website, available at 
http://www.ul.com/regulators/. 
44 S. REP. NO. 98-427 (1984). The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 
1815 (cited in 15 U.S.C. 4301), related to research and development joint ventures.  In 1993, the law was 
rewritten to include production joint ventures in addition to research. National Cooperative Production 
Amendments of 1993, pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993): 
§ 2 COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION: CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT 
OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE 
(a) FINDINGS - The Congress finds that - 
(1) technological innovation and its profitable commercialization are critical components of the 
ability of the United States to raise the living standards of Americans and to compete in world markets. 
(2) cooperative arrangements among nonaffiliated businesses in the private sector are often 
essential for successful technological innovation; and procompetitive cooperative innovation 
arrangements, and so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to promote such arrangements; 
and 
(3) the antitrust laws have been mistakenly perceived to inhibit procompetitive cooperative 
innovation arrangements, and so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to promote such 
arrangements. 
(b) Purpose - It is the purpose of this Act … to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and 
strengthen the competitiveness of the United States in world markets by clarifying the applicability of 
the rule of reason standard and establishing a procedure under which businesses may notify the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission of their cooperative ventures and thereby qualify 
for a single-damages limitation on civil antitrust liability. 
15 U.S.C. 4301 (1994). 
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certification for equipment interoperability purposes.45 This form of 
certification most directly addresses the economic motivation for 
certification—interoperability—which is an attribute that is both valued by 
buyers and difficult for them to ascertain prior to product purchase. 
 
Cable Television Laboratories (CableLabs), a non-profit research 
consortium founded in 1988, was formed not long after the passage of the 
NCRA.  Funded and controlled by cable operators (generally called 
multiple system operators, or MSOs) in the cable television industry, 
CableLabs leads the development of cable television standards, as well as 
provides certification and qualification testing for those standards.46 
Equipment vendors tend to ensure their designs meet CableLabs standards, 
and they tend to seek CableLabs certification, mainly because many MSOs 
require certification when making equipment purchases.  MSOs, in turn, are 
motivated to seek out certified vendors in order to increase the supply of 
interoperable equipment, which makes the equipment more of a commodity 
(an effect observable in cable modem pricing) and promotes standardization 
of system design and performance.  Testing is performed at CableLabs, and 
vendors are charged fees that range from $50,000 to $115,000 per product 
tested, depending on the standard to which conformance is being certified. 
 
Telcordia Technologies, a subsidiary of Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC), is a descendant of Bell Laboratories by 
way of Bellcore.47 The company has traditionally supplied standards 
setting, certification,48 and other services to the Regional Bell operating 
companies, as well as to other telephone companies and their equipment 
suppliers.  As is the case with the cable industry, telephony industry 
equipment suppliers pay for qualification testing so that they can meet the 
certification requirements of telephone operators.  Among other areas of 
proficiency, Telcordia inherited unique expertise in certifying the 
interoperability of products with Bell company operations and management 
databases. 
In recent years, Telcordia and the company’s proprietary OSMINE 
(Operations Systems Modifications for the Integration of Network 
Elements) process have engendered sharp criticism due to the high cost of 
 
45 Tim McElligot, Six Degrees of Preparation, TELEPHONY, October 16, 2000, at 48-60. 
46 CableLabs standards include the Data Over Cable Services Interface Specification (DOCSIS) for cable 
modems and the CableHome and PacketCable specifications. See the CableLabs website, available at 
http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/. 
47 Bellcore was established from parts of Bell Labs during the AT&T divestiture in 1984, and SAIC bought 
the organization in late 1998.  Bill Pitterman, Telcordia Technologies: The Journey to High Maturity, 17 IEEE 
SOFTWARE 4, August 2000, at 89-96 [hereinafter: Pitterman, Telcordia Technologies]. 
48 See Testing Services, the Telcordia website, available at http://www.telcordia.com/services/ 
testing/ntwk_integrity.html. 
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testing (as much as $2M per product) and the long duration of test cycles.49 
As a result, the largest Regional Bell operating company, Verizon, created 
its own accreditation program, and ten labs, including Telcordia’s lab, are 
currently accredited to certify compliance against standards important to 
Verizon.50 In this case, a large firm (rather than the government) has made 
an investment in an attempt to create a competitive market for 
interoperability-oriented certification testing. Moreover, Telcordia now has 
to compete for certification business.  Accordingly, Telcordia’s business 
strategy has shifted away from providing sole-source research and 
certification (as was the case in the Bellcore era and as is similar to the case 
with CableLabs)51 towards providing a broad array of services and 
technologies. 
 
3. Meta-Standard Certification: ISO 9000 
 
Nations may identify accrediting bodies that in turn accredit 
certification bodies.52 Not surprisingly, the details of quality systems can 
vary dramatically depending on the product being manufactured or the 
service being provided.  Meta-standard certification, then, is an attempt to 
provide useful certification across a very diverse and heterogeneous set of 
circumstances by focusing on process clarity rather than specific outcomes.  
One management practice meta-standard is the International Standards 
Organization ISO 9000 series of standards, which prescribes quality 
systems and their documentation and management (typically for 
manufacturers, although the series has been applied to service providers as 
well).53 A firm seeking certification creates and documents a quality system 
that is both specific to its own activities and in conformance with ISO 9000 
series principles.  An ISO 9000 certification body (typically a commercial 
firm offering auditing, certification, and consulting) then audits the firm to 
verify system conformance with the standard and with system 
documentation. 
 
49 Dan O’Shea, A Certified Mess, TELEPHONY, January 21, 2002, at 32-39. 
50 See the Verizon Independent Testing Laboratories Network Equipment Building System (NEBS) Testing 
Certification Program (NEBS-TCP) website, available at http://www.verizonnebs.com/tcppage.html. 
51 The transition of Bellcore from a consortium to a supplier was partly due to increasing competition 
between the consortium’s member Regional Bell operating companies.  Such competition undermines the viability 
of consortia. See Pitterman, Telcordia Technologies, cited supra at note 47. 
52 In the United States, three bodies are designated as accrediting bodies: the American National 
Accreditation Program for Registrars of Quality Systems, the American National Standards Institute, and the 
Registrar Accreditation Board.  See http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/info/ISODirectory/Country/country_US.html.
National accrediting bodies may themselves be accredited by a common international organization such as the 
International Accreditation Forum. See the International Accreditation Forum website, available at 
http://www.iaf.nu/. Note that ISO itself does not accredit any organization relative to accreditation or 
certification. 
53 Mustafa V. Uzumeri, ISO 9000 and Other Metastandards: Principles for Management Practice? 11 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVES 1, 21-36 (1997). 
3-May-05] E911: A CERTIFICATION PROPOSAL 17 
 
Companies adopt ISO 9000 for the following reasons, which appear 
in descending order: to meet customer certification requirements 
(particularly those of public sector customers), to reduce the possibility of 
product liability, and to increase the utility of quality improvement 
programs in general (consistent with the theme, broadly developed in the 
mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, that quality improvement increases a 
firm’s profitability).54 ISO 9000 certification has grown into its own 
industry, one that employs numerous consultants, trainers, auditors, and 
registrars. 
 
As became apparent by the late 1990s, however, the correlation 
between ISO 9000 certification and product quality is weaker than could be 
hoped.  Task forces in the UK evaluated this phenomenon and determined 
that this disparity is the result of variable quality among the broad array of 
certifying agencies.  In other words, certification of a quality system does 
not necessarily take into account the possibility that commitment to the 
quality process may decrease post-certification or that certification may be 
viewed as a hurdle to cross rather than as a new quality approach that 
should be assimilated into the operation and culture of the organization.  
Recommended changes to the ISO 9000 regime include calls to (1) reduce 
the number of accredited registrars so that more effort can be spent on 
accreditation, (2) use product and quality system certifications in 
combination, and (3) recognize the value of just-in-time practices.  Some of 
these changes are reflected in the more recent ISO 9001:2000 framework.55 
4. Certification for Consumers: The Wi-Fi Alliance 
 
The Wi-Fi Alliance is a non-profit trade association founded in 1999 
and organized by equipment and component providers interested in the 
market for IEEE 802.11 wireless local access network equipment.  The 
alliance had more than 200 member companies by July 2004, and it 
certified interoperability of more than 1,500 products between March 2000 
and July 2004.56 As with a number of other consortia, the alliance is 
 
54 Norman Burgess, Lessons Learned in Quality Management – A Rational Role for Certification, IEEE 
SYMPOSIUM ON PROS AND CONS OF ISO 9000 ACCREDITED CERTIFICATION 1998/421, 1/1-1/3 (March 31, 1999). 
55 See Id. See also L. Paul Dreyfus, Sanjay L. Ahire, & Maling Ebrahimpur, The Impact of Just-in-Time 
Implementation and ISO 9000 Certification on Total Quality Management, 51 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, May 2, 2004, at 125-141, and E. Davies & M. Whyman, ISO 9000:2000 – New 
ISO, New Responsibilities for Top Management, 10 ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 5, (Oct. 2000), at 
244-48.  See also Eitan Naveh & Alfred A. Marcus, When Does the ISO 9000 Quality Assurance Standard Lead 
to Performance Improvement? Assimilation and Going Beyond, 51 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING 
MANAGEMENT 3 (2004), at 352-63. 
56 See the Wi-Fi Alliance website, available at http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/ 
backgrounder.asp?TID=5. 
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intended to augment an otherwise established standards process (in this 
case, IEEE wireless networking) by providing interoperability certification 
and by building a consumer brand in order to ensure interoperability of 
purchased products.  The Wi-Fi Alliance accredits independent testing labs 
as Wi-Fi Interoperability Certification Labs.  These labs report results to the 
Wi-Fi Alliance, which in turn grants certification and the right to display 
appropriate Wi-Fi logos.  While only Wi-Fi members can request 
certification, the association’s wide membership suggests that barriers to 
membership are low; in other words, the association does not seem to 
substantially restrict entry in order to limit competition. 
 
5. Self-Regulation and Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Policy 
 
Environmental regulation has seen the most active experimentation 
in self-regulation of any area of social policy.  A sequence of environmental 
disasters (Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Three Mile Island) and a set of vocal non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) combine to represent public 
environmental interests, but recent neo-liberal trends towards deregulation 
recognize both the direct and indirect costs of command-and-control 
regulation.  The result has been a wave of self-regulatory experiments in 
which firms and industries enter into voluntary agreements to reduce 
environmental impact.57 
The environmental self-regulation experience has been decidedly 
mixed and has resulted in a number of findings that are beneficial to our 
discussion of telecommunications emergency services self-regulation.58 
These findings include both theoretical and empirical evidence of the 
detrimental impact of free-riding on effective industry-wide voluntary 
agreements,59 the importance of external stakeholder involvement in 
negotiating credible voluntary agreements,60 the critical role of public 
monitoring of conformance with voluntary agreements by independent 
 
57 See T. Dietz & P. C. Stern, NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION,
AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002); F. Convery & F. Lévêque, 
Applying Voluntary Approaches – Some Insights in RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL VOLUNTARY APPROACHES:
RESEARCH INSIGHTS FOR POLICY-MAKERS FROM THE POLICY WORKSHOP ON THE USE OF VOLUNTARY 
APPROACHES (Brussels, 2001). 
58 See T. Lookabaugh & D. C. Sicker, Self-Regulation of E911 for VoIP: Lessons for the Cable Industry 
from Environmental Voluntary Agreements, MAGNESS INSTITUTE ACADEMIC SEMINAR, San Francisco, CA, 2005. 
59 See A. A. King & M. J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry 
Responsible Care Program, 43 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 4 (2000), at 698-716; J. Rivera & P. D. 
Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas in 32 THE POLICY 
STUDIES JOURNAL 3 (2004), at 417-437. 
60 See J. Carmin, N. Darnall, et al., Stakeholder Involvement in the Design of U.S. Voluntary Environmental 
Programs: Does Sponsorship Matter? in 31 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 4 (2003), at 527-544. 
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parties,61 and the importance of a plausible threat of governmental 
regulation.62 
6. Certification Evolves: Telecommunications Certification Bodies 
 
Until the late 1990s, the regulatory procedure for standardizing and 
certifying devices for sale to the general public under FCC rules had not 
changed significantly.  For example, a company that wanted to market 
devices that connect to the telephone network under Part 263 64 or Part 6865 
of the FCC rules (described below) had to first complete a series of tests, 
which were either performed in the company’s own laboratory or 
outsourced to a third party.  The actual testing process tended to take 
anywhere from one day to one week, and the test results had to be submitted 
to the FCC.  The centrally controlled FCC approval process took up to three 
months, and the device could not be properly marketed in large commercial 
applications until it received FCC approval. The above example highlights  
the FCC’s device-level command-and-control approach. 
 
The questions, then, are these: What are these FCC rules, and why is 
device certification relevant in this context?  The answer to these questions 
is simple: Virtually every device that connects to the network must meet 
certain FCC specifications before it can appear on the market.  FCC Part 2, 
for example, is a massive collection of technical data spanning several 
hundred pages.  It covers international regulations, nomenclature and 
assignment of frequencies, and the complete table of frequency allocations. 
FCC Part 68, in turn, regulates the connection of terminal equipment to the 
telephone network, and any device that is regulated under Part 68 (e.g., the 
limits set for intentional and unintentional radiation) must also comply with 
the provisions of Part 15. Part 68 is important for future wireless 
applications, because any change in FCC regulations or policy is likely to 
affect all interrelated FCC compliance regulations simultaneously.  In the 
VoIP area, as we will see, new Internet-enabled telephones will easily span 
all of these areas and will require certification under many different parts of 
the FCC rules. 
 
61 See K. Harrison & W. Antweiler, Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Regulation, Regulatory Threats, and 
Non-Governmental Pressures in 22 JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 3 (2003), at 361-382. 
62 See M. Khanna, Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection in 15 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
SURVEYS 3 (2001), at 219-324; A. Alberini & K. Segerson, Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve 
Environmental Quality in 22 ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS (2002), at 157-184. 
63 47 CFR Ch. 1 (1998), Part 2—Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters; General Rules and 
Regulations. 
64 Id. 
65 47 CFR Ch. 1 (1998), Part 68—Connection of Terminal Equipment to the Telephone Network. 
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Indeed, even the most banal wireless applications (such as cordless 
phones) are regulated under Part 68 (for their connection to the network), 
Part 15 (for their radiation limitations in a broadcasting capacity), and Part 2 
(for their placement in the frequency allocation zoning map). In fact, future 
technologies—like VoIP devices—are likely to dramatically increase the 
complexity involved in adhering to FCC regulations.  For example, 
regulators used to be able to categorize transmitters and receivers with 
relative ease in a bygone era when television and radio were the primary 
subjects of regulation.  Today, however, new technological advances are 
supplanting these categorizations, and hybrid applications no longer fit 
neatly within any single FCC provision. Examples of these 
re-categorizations include frequencies originally intended for UHF 
television that have been reallocated for cellular66 and frequencies originally 
intended for garage-door openers67 that are now used for cordless phones, 
wireless in-home LAN, car alarms, and electronic dog fences. 
Categorization is quickly losing its meaning, and future regulations will 
likely have to address purely technical criteria rather than application-
specific criteria.  Although VoIP is sometimes characterized as a 
revolutionary technology, in terms of its development it is merely one of 
several hundred new devices or products entering the marketplace. 
 
In 1998, the FCC anticipated that its rules would not be able to keep 
up with technological advancements, and it shifted away from its traditional 
command-and-control paradigm by adopting ET Docket 97-94.68 The 
FCC’s action amended certain rules in order to 
 
1) simplify our existing equipment authorization processes; 
2) deregulate the equipment authorization requirements for 
certain types of equipment; and 3) provide for electronic 
filing of applications for equipment authorization.  The 
 
66 See In the Matter of an Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency and 806-960 MHz; and 
Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91 and 93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in the Land Mobile 
Service Between 806 and 960 MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752 (1974) (discussing the rulemaking procedure that deals with 
reallocation of UHF channels for cellular telephone services). 
67 The 2.4 GHz frequency band was originally designated for home devices, but it now includes everything 
from wireless networking to invisible dog fences. See Kenneth R. Carter, Ahmed Lahjouji, & Neal McNeil, 
Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues,
FCC Office of Engineering Technology, OSP Working Paper No. 39, May 2003, available at 
www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (last visited August 15, 2003). 
68 ET Docket 97-94, Amendment of Parts 2, 15, 18 and Other Parts of the Commission’s Rules to Simplify 
and Streamline the Equipment Authorization Process for Radio Frequency Equipment, resulting in Report and 
Order 13 FCC Rcd. 11415 (1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/oet/dockets/et97-94/ (last visited March 11, 
2005). 
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proposals were designed to reduce the burden of the 
equipment authorization program on manufacturers.69 
As a result, the FCC shifted the regulatory burden for approval of various 
devices to the private sector.70 The thrust of this action, then, was to 
organize a provision for so-called Telecommunications Certification Bodies 
(TCBs), whose objective is to conduct various tests and certifications 
following essentially the same criteria previously employed by the FCC.71 
Another component of this plan was the adoption of Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) to allow foreign parties to evaluate equipment 
conformance with U.S. technical requirements.72 The process for approval 
under the new regulation is quite simple, and many expect it to have an 
important effect on domestic and international commerce.  The case may be 
most significant in terms of international commerce, where European 
organizations have enjoyed advances in standardization through Europe-
wide groups like ETSI73 and CENELEC74 and through country-specific 
groups like AFNOR (France),75 the famous TÜV (Germany),76 and others.77 
If a U.S. company wants to market a new device to the European Union, the 
company must seek out a Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) under 
 
69 FCC Report and Order, ET Docket No. 97-94 Section II (3) (April 1998), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Orders/1998/fcc98058.txt.
70 See Gen. Docket 98-16, Report No. FCC 98-338, entitled  “1998 Biennial Regulatory Review – 
Amendment of Parts 2, 25 and 68 of the Commission’s Rules to Further Streamline the Equipment Authorization 
Process for Radio Frequency Equipment, Modify the Equipment Authorization Process for Telephone Terminal 
Equipment, Implement Mutual Recognition Agreements and Begin Implementation of the Global Mobile Personal 
Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) Arrangements,” adopted December 17, 1998, released December 23, 
1998. 
71 TCBs are now captured in 47 CFR Section 2.960, and they are described on the FCC website as follows:   
The Commission may designate a Telecommunications Certification Body (TCB) to process an 
application to determine whether the product meets the Commission’s requirements and shall 
issue a written grant of equipment authorization. A TCB may authorize such devices subject to 
Certification as the FCC except new technology devices or devices with unique RF (radio 
frequency) safety concerns. 
FCC website, available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/oet/ea/procedures.html. 
72 Gen. Docket 98-16, at Section II (19).  See also Document 98-338, Footnote 36, which points out that the 
FCC authorizes the delegation to MRAs, but the specific technical data must be delineated within the bilateral 
agreement in question: “The model APEC MRA provides that countries will identify the relevant regulations and 
requirements at the time they enter into bilateral agreements.” 
73 See the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) website, available at www.etsi.org.  
ETSI was borne out of the development of Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standards across 
Europe. See generally Howard A Shelanski, Competition Policy for Mobile Broadband Networks, 3 JOURNAL ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97, 111-12 (describing GSM and its relationship with ETSI). 
74 See the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) website, available at 
www.cenelec.org.  See also generally Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety 
Directive: Another Call for U.S. Exporters to Comply with the ISO 9000 Series, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
155 (1996) (describing the role of various standards-setting organizations in Europe and their relationship with 
certification programs like ISO 9000). 
75 See the Groupe AFNOR website, available at www.afnor.fr.  See also generally Lori M. Wallach, 
Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA and International Harmonization of 
Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823 (2002) [hereinafter: Wallach, Accountable Governance] (describing AFNOR 
and other state-run standards-setting organizations in Europe and elsewhere). 
76 See the TÜV Rheinland Group homepage, available at www.tuv.com. 
77 See Wallach, Accountable Governance, cited supra at note 75. 
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Article 10(2) of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive.78 A CAB, also 
known in Europe simply as a “Competent Body,”79 is similar to a TCB in 
the United States. The European CAB then issues a “Technical Construction 
File,” which consists of a technical judgment regarding the overall 
compliance of a product.  If the company receives a judgment in its favor, 
then the device receives the coveted “CE” mark, which can be seen on 
virtually all electronic devices sold worldwide.80 
Since roughly 1998, the European process and the U.S. process have 
grown increasingly similar, and certification bodies (and their processes) 
are themselves beginning to standardize on both sides of the Atlantic.  In 
both the European Union and the United States, companies with approved 
telecommunications devices are expected to keep their certification reports 
on file in each country where the devices are sold, and the reports must 
stand up to scrutiny if device approval is ever questioned. A CAB-certified 
(Europe) or TCB-certified (United States) device may pass all tests, but if a 
report does not meet with inspector approval or if incorrect test data is 
discovered, the company in question may be forced to suspend shipments 
until it presents acceptable proof of conformity.  In addition to receiving 
certification, devices must thus be able to sustain audit.  
 
7. An Expanded Role for Enforcement 
 
It is within this latter inspection and “policing” capacity that the 
FCC will continue to perform its own independent surveillance of products 
on the market81 using random product testing mechanisms and other 
procedures to investigate allegations of non-compliance.82 Ultimately, 
however, the certification process of the delegates (the TCBs) will help to 
free up FCC resources, marking the beginning of an ongoing shift in the 
role of the FCC from command-and-control regulation to ex post 
78 The Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Directive 89/336/EEC, available at http://tinyurl.com/4k8n4.
79 See John Bengston, Connecting Terminal Equipment Under the New EC Regs, 9 COMPUTER LAWYER 7, 
32 (1992).  The article outlines the early challenges and regulations facing the European Community.  The article 
may be somewhat outdated now, but it highlights the challenges of setting up uniformity in the pre-GSM 
European climate in the early 1990s. 
80 See the European Union’s website on Electrical Equipment, available at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/enterprise/electr_equipment/index_en.htm. 
81 For a discussion of changes made and policing functions (including fines), see David E. Hilliard & Kurt E. 
DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations, 9 COMPUTER LAWYER 9, 27 (1992) [hereinafter: Hilliard 
& DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations].  The article discusses the expansion of enforcement at 
the FCC level: 
[In 1992, the FCC] substantially expanded the enforcement of its computing device rules. … The 
penalties for marketing unauthorized or improperly tested computers or computer peripherals 
increased [to] (1) civil forfeitures of $75,000 for continuing violations and $10,000 each for other 
violations; (2) criminal penalties as high as $500,000 in fines and two years in prison; (3) civil 
litigation; and (4) equipment confiscation. 
82 FCC Gen. Docket No. 98-68, Report and Order, cited infra at note 84.  
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enforcement functions.  Nonetheless, the FCC remains responsible for 
issuing certification to TCBs (a responsibility that it shares in certain cases 
with the National Institute of Standards and Technology),83 and the 
aforementioned rules allow either the TCB or the FCC to revoke the 
interconnection authorization of terminal equipment.84 Thus, the FCC still 
retains an important role in enforcement control, and it may even revoke 
equipment placed on the market after authorization has been acquired by a 
TCB.  The law requires the FCC to prove that (1) the equipment approval 
has been obtained by misrepresentation, (2) the approved equipment causes 
harm to the public switched telephone network, (3) the responsible party 
willfully or repeatedly fails to comply with the terms and conditions of its 
equipment approval, or (4) the responsible party willfully or repeatedly fails 
to comply with any FCC rule, regulation, or order relating to terminal 
equipment under the Communications Act of 1934. 
 
It is not yet known if the enforcement arm of the FCC will prove 
effective, especially in cases where a TCB certifies the commercial 
application of a product that subsequently interferes with other entities.  
Bell Atlantic raised this issue, contending that foreign certification of 
equipment could introduce partiality into the authorization process and lead 
to inconsistent application of standards.  Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the increasing number of FCC representatives at events such 
as COMDEX,85 where new technologies are often shown to the public,86 
demonstrates the organization’s willingness to embrace its enforcement 
role. 
 
The more pressing question, however, is this: how will the FCC 
actually go about setting up deterrents to prevent wrongs, such as the 
proliferation of, say, an inexpensive, uncertified VoIP device that enters the 
market and takes off rapidly?  It may be difficult or even impossible to 
recall all of the devices, especially if they realize major sales within a short 
 
83 See “Accreditation of Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs) and Certification Bodies (CBs) 
under the Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA),” National Institute of Standards and Technology website, 
available at http://ts.nist.gov/ts/htdocs/210/gsig/tcb-program.htm (last visited March 15, 2005). 
84 See FCC Gen. Docket No. 98-68, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1998), at 15, available at 
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Notices/1998/fcc98092.pdf (“[W]e anticipate that circumstances 
may arise where it may be necessary to suspend or revoke a TCB’s certification authority”).  See also FCC Gen 
Docket No. 98-68, Report and Order (1998), available at www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Orders/ 
1998/fcc98338.pdf [hereinafter: FCC Gen. Docket 98-68, Report and Order]. A TCB may revoke a certification 
up to thirty days after issuance.  However, after thirty days, a certification “can only be revoked by the 
Commission.  A TCB shall notify both the applicant and the Commission when a grant is rescinded.”  Id., at 49. 
85 COMDEX is a major technology fair that, until recently, was held annually in Las Vegas.  In 2004, the 
organizers cancelled the event for the first time because of poor participation from vendors.  See Comdex’s 
Organizers Cancel This Year’s Show in Las Vegas, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 24, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7318650. 
86 See Hilliard & DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations, cited supra at note 81 (stating that 
in fall 1991 the FCC issued more than 100 violations to vendors who exhibited unauthorized computer equipment 
at COMDEX). 
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period of time (such as during the Christmas season).  The device 
manufacturers could be sham organizations purchased through international 
e-commerce portal sites—or even offshore companies—making them very 
difficult to monitor from the FCC’s point of view.  Only through efficient 
delegation to third-party authorities (e.g., the TCBs) will the FCC have any 
opportunity to allocate the resources needed to police the proliferation and 
e-commerce distribution of new technologies. 
 
8. Certification Processes 
 
Each of the preceding examples involves a certification process 
from which we can abstract the following common and desirable elements: 
 
• Pre-Certification. Certification processes, expectations, and 
procedures are well-documented, and certification officials have 
easy access to educational and background materials.  If the 
certification process is sufficiently complex, a third-party 
community of trainers, consultants, and test equipment providers  
will participate in certification activities.  The goal is to facilitate a 
standard, straightforward, repeatable process.  Fees are documented, 
predictable, and reasonable. 
 
• Certification. Testing and evaluation against the certification 
criteria take place.  Certification of easily transportable equipment 
occurs at specified test facilities, preferably facilities that are 
conveniently (or even regionally) located.  Certification teams go on 
site to test equipment that is non-transportable and to evaluate 
facilities, infrastructures, or processes.  Testing is prompt and 
transparent, and  it follows designated guidelines. 
 
• Post-Certification. The certifying authority follows a clear process 
that clarifies deadlines and formats for reporting test results.  The 
reasons for any failures are clearly documented, and comments and 
recommendations are suggested.  The certifying authority follows a 
clear and transparent procedure for questioning and appealing 
results and for publicizing successful certification, both by the 
certifier and by the certified body. A publicly accessible database 
contains successful certification results.  The certification authority 
documents and institutes a periodic follow-up re-inspection process. 
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C.  Implications for VoIP Emergency Services Certification 
 
We can make several general observations about VoIP emergency 
services certification based on the preceding theories and specific examples 
of certification.  (These observations will then inform specific 
recommendations provided in Section VI.)  To begin, certification of 
emergency service capabilities for VoIP better fits the category of 
certification for social policy goals than certification for economic reasons, 
mainly because firms have not traditionally been able to charge consumers 
for 911 services.87 The implication is that standards and related certification 
bodies are not likely to arise unless they are naturally driven by the 
industry’s own economic interest (as is the case with TCBs such as 
Telcordia, CableLabs, and Wi-Fi Alliance). 
 
General evidence suggests that social policy self-regulation requires 
strong external motivation.  In the case of VoIP emergency services, 
associations of public safety officials, such as the National Emergency 
Number Association (NENA) and the Association of Public Safety 
Communications Officers, already play an active role in prompting self-
regulatory discussions.88 However, the effectiveness of this external 
motivation is seemingly derived largely from the presumption that these 
organizations have the ears of regulators at the local and federal levels.  For 
example, no truly separate non-governmental organizations play an active 
regulatory role (e.g., by influencing consumers).  Hence, it appears likely 
that government influence, either direct or indirect, is needed in this case.  
Such influence can naturally take a number of forms.  The government 
could inspire self-regulation through the credible threat of potential 
regulation, or it could actively share regulation responsibilities with social 
policy organizations.  Moreover, although the FCC is the most obvious 
choice to take the reins of such social policy regulatory initiatives, 
government influence could also come from state agencies (assuming they 
can be sufficiently coordinated to be effective) or from a combination of 
federal and state agencies. 
 
In short, social policy self-regulation faces a credibility challenge.  
Consequently, certification processes should not be held captive to the 
certifying body, which could make the standards subject to use in extracting 
 
87 Firms subject to rate regulation may remain relatively neutral toward the imposition of 911 requirements if 
they are able to recover costs through a general increase in prices.  However, we expect many firms involved in 
VoIP to be excluded from rate regulation and consequently motivated to avoid costs without offsetting revenues 
unless other issues, such as the threat of government regulation, arise. 
88 See the National Emergency Number Association website, available at http://www.nena9-1-
1.org/VoIP_IP/index.htm and http://www.apcointl.org. 
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monopoly rents (by restricting industry participation) or could induce the 
standards to be set at inappropriate performance levels.89 One option here is 
the use of a broad-based standards-setting organization that openly invites 
the participation of other parties, such as government and consumer 
organizations.  In parallel, it would be valuable to create a “hierarchy of 
trust” of accrediting certifiers, whereby the root accrediting organization 
remains credibly independent of the certified companies.  This role of the 
root accrediting organization can be played by the government, as in the 
case of OSHA, or by a sufficiently independent group of institutions, as in 
the case of the ISO 9000 series of standards.  The role should probably not 
be played by a major industry firm, as in the case of Verizon’s testing 
certification lab, or by a tightly controlled industry consortium.90 
Many certification processes that involve conformance testing are 
overseen by a competitive market of certifiers (e.g., product safety 
certification, telephone company product interoperability certification, and 
ISO 9000 quality system certification).  Such an approach may work for 
VoIP emergency services certification as well.  Note, though, that 
implementation of this approach would reinforce the need for a hierarchy of 
accreditation so that the certifiers’ capabilities can be trusted. 
 
Furthermore, VoIP emergency services certification is likely to 
consist mainly of software certification.  Here, it would be wise to 
encourage certification processes that engage with software development 
throughout its cycle rather than solely at the cycle’s end.  Also, some 
aspects of VoIP emergency service performance will depend on network and 
system characteristics that can be expected to vary widely among VoIP 
providers.  An element of system meta-management standardization and 
certification, similar to ISO 9000, may be appropriate in such 
heterogeneous circumstances, but we need to learn from the ISO 9000 
experience so that we do not rely solely on process certification to control 
outcomes. 
 
In fact, consumers can play a key role in discriminating between 
certified and non-certified firms and between different levels of certification 
through their buying choices.  Examples of such consumer involvement 
include certification by UL and the Wi-Fi Alliance.  However, for the 
 
89 As noted earlier, standards can be set too high (in an effort to restrict competition) or too low (in an effort 
to reduce industry costs at the expense of overall welfare). 
90 While the Wi-Fi Alliance is clearly a membership-restricted industry consortium, it nonetheless has a 
fairly open membership policy; as such, it is subject to little criticism of “tight control.”  However, even an 
organization with broad industry membership risks the possibility that opaque and self-interested policies, the 
kind that are sufficient to undermine credibility, could be implemented. 
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certification to be effective, consumers need to be aware of the 
certification’s implications and confident in its legitimacy, thus implying an 
investment in consumer awareness and in policing inappropriate assertions 
of certification.  These functions can be accomplished through the 
combined efforts of the government and industry trade associations (e.g.,
the Wi-Fi Alliance), both of which create a brand around certification, 
obtain legal rights to certification marks, and prosecute infringers, as well as 
by individual certified firms, which are generally motivated to promote the 
significance of certification in order to differentiate themselves from non-
certified firms. 
 
Finally, careful consideration of the role of insurance and liability 
mitigation could accelerate regulatory progress and industry participation 
beyond that which would be naturally motivated by the threat of 
government regulation.  Here again, government involvement can 
potentially help.  For example, governmental roles, such as in setting 
appropriate standards and serving as the root accrediting body for certifiers, 
can enhance the status of standards and the broad acceptance of 
certification.  Insurance industry participation in standards setting and in 
institutional design of certification is also desirable if it leads to differential 
premiums for industry participants based on certification. 
 
III. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
In this section, we will provide a technology assessment of VoIP 
emergency services based on a classification of fundamental trends in 
technology and protocol models.  We will begin by reviewing the basic 
operations and functions of today’s emergency services.  Next, we will 
discuss the engineering and operations of VoIP systems.  Finally, we will 
describe how VoIP emergency services might be implemented and offer a 
set of possible (preliminary) VoIP emergency services requirements. 
 
A.  Emergency Services and the PSTN 
 
In the context of the PSTN, emergency services in the United States 
have long been known by the dialing convention 9-1-1.91 When this 
number is dialed, an emergency call is routed to the appropriate public 
safety answering point (PSAP) and then routed to fire, medical, or law 
enforcement agencies, as appropriate.  Enhanced 911 (E911) added a 
capability that enables the emergency services dispatcher to see the calling 
 
91 For background on 911, see “911 Services,” Federal Communications Commission website, available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/911. 
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number and information about the caller’s location.  Regulations imposed 
on emergency services obligations vary across services, technologies, and 
local, national, and international borders.92 In the United States, certain 
carriers are required to support 911 service (under the 911 Act),93 with 
regulatory responsibility divided among federal, state, and local 
authorities.94 
In traditional E911, the initial routing of a 911 call is provided by the 
central office, which uses a routing database to associate the caller with the 
appropriate PSAP.  E911 provides calling number information in the 
Automatic Number Identification (ANI) and location information in the 
Automatic Location Information (ALI), and it assumes that the PSAP that 
receives the call is geographically related to the call origination location 
(this routing process is accomplished using a selective router database 
search).  The PSAP then accesses a Public Safety-Automatic Line 
Information (PS-ALI) database to associate the calling number with a 
physical location. At this point, the PSAP may forward the call to an 
emergency call center, which performs another database search (on a 
database maintained by the telephone company) to associate the caller’s 
phone number with a particular location.  
 
B.  Emergency Services and Wireless 
 
Many of the problems facing VoIP emergency services are similar to 
those of emergency services for commercial mobile radio service 
(“wireless” telephony).  Although the technologies are different, some of the 
same solution mechanisms apply.  For example, the development and 
adoption of wireless emergency service solutions followed a long and 
convoluted path.95 While many of the issues that arose were attributed to 
 
92 Although common in many respects, emergency services regulation in the European Union differs from 
emergency services regulation in the United States.  A simple but obvious difference is the emergency number 
itself (911 in the United States, 112 in Europe).  “Commission Recommendation on the Processing of Caller 
Location Information in Electronic Communication Networks for the Purpose of Location-Enhanced Emergency 
Call Services,” July 25, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_189/ 
l_18920030729en00490051.pdf). 
93 “In the Matter of Implementation of 911 Act: The Use of N11 Codes and Other Abbreviated Dialing 
Arrangements,” Fifth Report and Order (CC Docket No. 92-105) and First Report and Order (WT Docket No. 
00-110), 2001. 
94 For example, the 911 Act requires the FCC to take a leadership and support role in implanting wireless 
911, but the Act does not give the FCC the authority to regulate statewide plans. “About State 911 Deployment 
Plans,” Federal Communications Commission website, available at http://www.fcc.gov/911/stateplans/
about.html.
95 Dale N. Hatfield, Challenges of Network Design in an Increasingly Deregulated, Competitive Market, 
Remarks at the IEEE International Symposium, March 27, 2003, available at 
http://www.im2003.org/presentation%20files/RemarksDH_IM2003.doc. See also A Report on the Technical and 
Operational Issues Impacting Wireless Enhanced 911 Services, 2002, available at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513296239, and  Dale Hatfield, 
Architecture as Policy, in SHERRIE BOLIN, ED., THE STANDARDS EDGE: DYNAMIC TENSION (2004). 
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technical uncertainty (due to an inadequate level of technical understanding 
early in the process), a significant number of the delays were the direct 
result of industry resistance (due to the absence of strict timelines).  Another 
issue to consider is whether or not certain policy approaches might hasten 
the development effort.  In the wireless emergency services regulatory 
process, the FCC played a substantial role in specifying and assessing the 
technical characteristics of the location technology.  This initiative 
consumed considerable time.  An industry-led specification and assessment 
process might have hastened this process, particularly if regulatory agencies 
had monitored the process and set deadlines.  Another issue to consider is 
that of the implementation process itself.  Wireless emergency services 
made use of a phased implementation approach that considered short-term 
versus long-term solutions.  Such an approach can help to promote interim 
solutions and allow for the creation of reasonable timelines for long-term 
solutions.96 
One important lesson worth considering is this:  past regulations 
should not necessarily be used to define future policy.  Different 
technologies operate in different ways, and these variations can lead to the 
development of new capabilities and features.  For example, as Henning 
Schulzrinne points out, VoIP offers a number of advantages over voice 
telephony, including higher resilience, faster call setup, accessibility 
support, multimedia support, greater cost efficiency, more call data, no 
telephone reliance, and greater competition.97 In addition, unlike traditional 
telephony, IP phones do not need to associate with a local central office, and 
they have little to no need for explicit voice service providers.  Instead, the 
functions of the provider are dispersed and require minimal provider 
assistance.  The development of policies that do not appreciate such 
differences could signal the loss of technical opportunities to better serve 
society. 
 
96 An FCC news release describes the obligations imposed on certain carriers in terms of providing 
emergency services.  The regulations on carriers are imposed in two phases, the first of which requires carriers to 
report the wireless caller’s phone number at the location of the antenna that received the call.  The E911 second 
phase requires wireless carriers to provide the precise location of a 911 caller within 50 to 100 meters.  
Deployment of the second phase began in October 2001 and is scheduled for completion by December 31, 2005.  
See FCC Expands E911 Rules, FCC NEWS, November 13, 2003, available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-241214A1.pdf. 
97 See Henning Schulzrinne, 9-1-1 Calls for Voice-Over-IP, Ex-Parte Filing for Docket 94-102, February 28, 
2003, available at www.cs.columbia.edu/IRT/papers/emergency.pdf.
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C.  VoIP Technology 
 
In simple terms, VoIP carries speech over an IP-based network.98 
The power and complexity of VoIP come largely from its ability to separate 
functions that were traditionally bound together, such as transport and 
signaling, thereby providing many more options for each function based on 
ubiquitous and increasingly inexpensive IP-based networking and IP-
compatible access technologies, processing, and storage.  
 
1. VoIP Parameters 
 
IP networks may not offer the same level of performance as circuit-
switched networks for voice communications.  In order to obtain a similar 
level of performance, we must explicitly consider specific VoIP parameters, 
such as encoding, delay, and transport. 
 
On a VoIP telephone call, voice is transmitted over packet networks.  
This transmission requires the conversion of analog voice to a digitized 
form, followed by a subsequent encapsulation of the digital content into a 
packet technology before the content is transmitted using an access 
technology.  The initial analog conversion process is referred to as 
encoding.99 After the analog content has been encoded into a digital format, 
the information is packetized (with the help of a transport layer)100 and 
passed to the access technology (e.g., Ethernet) for delivery on the network.  
At the other end, the digital information is retrieved and converted back into 
 
98 The difference between VoIP providers and VoIP services is worth considering.  VoIP as a product can be 
offered much like any other software application (e.g., Microsoft Word).  Some VoIP products can be installed on 
a PC and made to run with little (or no) service provider participation.  Some of the simpler products include 
NetMeeting, which is sold by software giant Microsoft.  See the description on Microsoft’s NetMeeting website, 
available at http://www.microsoft.com/windows/netmeeting/. Vonage, a service provider, also sells a product that 
can be loaded onto an individual’s computer. See the description on Vonage’s website, available at 
http://www.vonage.com/features.php?feature=softphone. Such products make use of the network to reach other 
end points and rely on so-called “intelligence” within the product (i.e., software features or information added to 
the product, such as through software updates).  On the other hand, a VoIP service provider can augment a 
product by including additional functionality, routing and database capabilities, security, and more.  In this model, 
the product may still be software, or it may be a combination of physical devices and software coupled closely to 
the service provider.  
99 In digital telephony over the traditional PSTN network, voice is usually encoded using PCM-u or PCM-A, 
resulting in a bandwidth requirement of 56-64 Kbps.  However, a variety of different compression algorithms can 
be applied in VoIP, providing all participating terminals have the required capability.  Various algorithms can 
introduce quality, delay, computation, and bandwidth tradeoffs.  For example, G.723.1 reduces the bandwidth 
usage of the call to 5.3 Kbps, but it also introduces a computational delay of 67.5 ms.  See generally DANIEL 
COLLINS, CARRIER GRADE VOICE OVER IP (McGraw-Hill, 2000). 
100 Typically, the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) adds important timing and other information relevant 
to voice and other time-sensitive media traffic.  Next, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides limited 
multiplexing and data detection.  Unlike its peer protocol, TCP, UDP does not provide error recovery; instead, 
error management is left to RTP and the voice codec used.  Finally, UDP packets are placed in IP packets and 
delivered to a specified Internet address.  See generally COLIN PERKINS, RTP: AUDIO AND VIDEO FOR THE 
INTERNET (Addison-Wesley Professional Publishing, 2003). 
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analog form, which the listener can then understand.  VoIP permits a wider 
range of choices and tradeoffs among performance parameters than 
traditional PSTN.  These choices and tradeoffs include the following: 
 
• Distortion. Low bit rate compression may be bandwidth efficient, 
but it may also distort speech. 
 
• Errors. Voice traffic has some degree of error tolerance (e.g., a
small amount of missing information will not impact intelligibility, 
whereas even a small error in a financial transaction is considered 
intolerable).  However, a high enough error rate from lost packets or 
errored packets degrades data intelligibility. 
 
• Delay. Compression algorithms, packetization, and other stages of 
packet transmission induce delay.  Delays in excess of 250 
milliseconds can be annoying, and long delays tend to induce a half-
duplex conversation in which each party pauses for a substantial 
period of time after speaking to determine if the other party wants to 
speak. 
 
• Loaded Networks and Quality of Service. Both errors and delay 
are affected by whether or not the networks involved in transmitting 
the voice are loaded (i.e., whether they are subject to traffic that 
occupies a substantial fraction of their capacity) and whether or not 
they have some form of prioritization capability (i.e., quality of 
service, or QoS).  Loaded networks that lack QoS typically induce 
long and variable delays (jitter) and sometimes drop packets. 
 
• Echo. Echo, a traditional issue in analog telephony, can still be an 
issue in VoIP, depending on the design of the analog portions of the 
system. 
 
• Power. Analog PSTN terminals can be powered by the phone 
network.  Assuming that the phone network has backup power, the 
system (including 911 service) can remain operational even if the 
customer premises is without power.  VoIP systems do not 
automatically have such a backup system (although, to be fair, 
neither do cordless phones, which are connected to the PSTN). 
 
For emergency services, we are concerned with the potential impact of these 
characteristics on the intelligibility of calls and on users’ capability to place 
emergency service calls during power outages. 
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2. VoIP Signaling 
 
While the traditional functions of setting up and tearing down calls 
persist in VoIP, VoIP can augment these functions in many ways by 
exploiting ubiquitous IP networks and inexpensive processing and storage 
capabilities.  VoIP signaling protocols control these functions, and these 
protocols continue to evolve and include several variants (in some cases 
competing variants, in other cases, complementary).  The most important 
variants are the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), H.323, media gateway 
protocols,101 and a number of proprietary protocols.  Here, we focus 
primarily on the role of SIP-based systems in supporting emergency 
services. 
 
SIP,102 a protocol developed within the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF),103 provides for the establishment, modification, and 
termination of sessions (or calls).  A SIP network generally consists of user 
agents, proxies, registrars, and redirect servers, all interconnected via an IP 
network.  These devices exchange messages in a process used to establish 
the call, and they do so in a manner analogous to the now widespread 
packet-signaling system used in the PSTN, Signaling System 7 (SS7).  SIP 
could enable emergency services enhancements by providing a richer 
information set than ANI and ALI.  For example, an individual could 
program a VoIP device to transmit medical records or emergency contact 
instructions to an emergency calling center (via SIP).  Such functions, if 
considered highly desirable socially and executable at a reasonable cost, 
could easily become subjects of future social policy, or, as we suggest in 
this paper, self-regulation. 
 
101 Media gateway protocols include the Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), MEGACO, and H.248.  
A media gateway might be used to interface between a VoIP network and the PSTN, and a media gateway 
controller interacts with the signaling systems in each domain and manages the configuration of the media 
gateway.  The separation of voice processing from management and the capability to independently distribute the 
functions result in an architecture called softswitch. VoIP architectures in which softswitch and interfacing to the 
PSTN play a substantial role generally provide less end user control over system behavior.  However, such 
constraints may aid in the implementation of traditional PSTN system functionality, including E911.  In any case, 
this type of architecture will be important for a substantial period (likely measured in multiple decades), while 
VoIP and PSTN systems must coexist. See generally Alexandra M. Wilson, Voice Over Internet Protocol: Ready 
for Prime Time, PLI Order Number 6061, 819 PLI/Pat 421, February-March 2005 (describing the basic 
functionalities of VoIP and a media gateway). 
102 J. Rosenberg et. al., Session Initiation Protocol, IETF Network Working Group Request for Comments 
No. 3261 (2002), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3261.txt [hereinafter, RFC 3261].  
103 Two IETF working groups, SIP and SIPPING, are active in the development of session-related protocols.  
These groups have developed various standards (Requests for Comments, or RFCs) and drafts, and SIP RFC 3261 
represents the core protocol. Id. 
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D.  Emergency Services for VoIP 
 
As a basis for a technical model, we turn to the work of the IETF.  
The IETF has developed several Internet Drafts and Requests for 
Comments describing the potential operation of VoIP emergency services 
based on the use of SIP and associated protocols. In this section, we will 
briefly describe these works in progress and highlight areas relevant to our 
model.  While some of these drafts will not reach maturity, we should 
nonetheless be able to describe a reasonable VoIP emergency services 
model based on this work. 
 
We propose the following VoIP emergency services requirements, 
which are based loosely on work within the IETF:104 (1) support a 
reasonable QoS connection,105 (2) use a recognized emergency service 
number (the equivalent of 9-1-1) to identify an emergency call, (3) route 
calls to the appropriate response group (PSAP), (4) establish a means of 
locating the caller, (5) establish a means of identifying the caller, and 
(6) establish a means of testing the system.106 Other concerns involving 
security or network operations are more general to VoIP, though they still 
may warrant consideration during the process of testing VoIP emergency 
service operations.  Furthermore, mechanisms for privacy, authentication, 
authorization, and availability will be required. 
 
We should note that much of the operation of SIP-based emergency 
services would rely on well-established and commonly deployed protocols, 
including SIP,107 Domain Name Service (DNS), Realtime Transport 
Protocol (RTP)108 and ENUM.109 In addressing the functionality not 
provided within these specifications, we turn to various draft documents, 
which establish that the SIP community is resolving many of the problems 
associated with VoIP emergency services.  A draft entitled “Emergency 
 
104 Henning Schulzrinne, Emergency Calling, IETF Working Document, October 18, 2004, available at 
draft-schulzrinne-sipping-emergency-arch-02.  Note that IETF documents are referenced, posted, and archived in 
different locations on the Internet.  The previous citation string should lead to the document if that string is cut 
and pasted it into any search engine.  This citation methodology is used periodically in this section. 
105 We realize that this requirement is not a part of the IETF specifications and that many people will 
question its need.  Nonetheless, if the communications cannot support the intended media (or negotiate a new 
media type), the rest of the emergency services mechanisms are moot. 
106 VoIP-based emergency services users and service providers may wish to test the operation of their 
service.  Such testing might be motivated by reconfigurations, new installations, power outages, changes in 
service or service provider, changes in location, or simple maintenance testing.  As the industry stands today, 
there really is no mechanism for consumers to complete a “test call” to E911, and the first call that consumers 
make is likely to be made in times of emergency.  Thus, a policy and process for testing may be valuable. 
107 See RFC 3261, cited supra at note 102. 
108 RTP is the protocol used for carrying traffic such as voice and video on the Internet.  See 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1889.txt. 
109 ENUM is a domain name service that supports the translation between Internet addresses (URLs) and 
telephone numbers.  See generally the ENUM website, available at www.enum.org.
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Services for Internet Telephony Systems,” for example, describes how SIP 
might be used to provide emergency services,110 proposes an architecture 
based on existing SIP features, and makes use of DNS mechanisms to 
provide location mapping.  A second draft entitled “Emergency Services 
URI for the Session Initiation Protocol”111 defines two universal emergency 
SIP Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), which can be thought of as 
emergency numbers like 9-1-1, and suggests ways to increase the likelihood 
of being able to contact an emergency call center.   
 
Moreover, several drafts address the problem of location 
identification112 by specifying the use of object formats, privacy 
mechanisms, and other protocols.  Other drafts propose methods of 
conveying user agent capabilities and profiles, both of which help to 
provide a fully functioning emergency system.113 An important emergency 
service capability is caller authentication,114 and the SIP specification 
documents authentication techniques, as do a number of draft documents.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the provision of VoIP emergency services 
needs to account for interfacing between the PSTN and VoIP networks.  As 
indicated in greater detail below, early implementations of VoIP emergency 
services have been designed largely within the context of interfaced VoIP 
and PSTN networks, with PSAPs and emergency service responders on the 
PSTN side.115 
A phased approach could be employed to replicate emergency 
services functionality in the SIP VoIP environment, as described by Henning 
 
110 See Henning Schulzrinne, SIPPING, available at draft-schulzrinne-sipping-emergency-arch-01. 
111 See Henning Schulzrinne, Emergency Services URI for the Session Initiation Protocol, IETF Document 
(work in progress), February 2004, available at draft-ietf-sipping-sos-00. 
112 See J. Peterson, A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format, IETF Document (work in 
progress), June 2004, available at draft-ietf-geopriv-pidf-lo-02.  See also J. Polk, Requirements for Session 
Initiation Protocol Location Conveyance, IETF Document (work in progress), February 2004, available at draft-
ietf-sipping-location-requirements-00; J. Polk, et. al., Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Option for 
Coordinate-based Location Configuration Information, IETF Document (work in progress), December 2003, 
available at draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option-03; Henning Schulzrinne, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses, IETF Document (work in progress), July 2004, available at 
draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-03; and Anthony LaMarca, et al., Place Lab: Device Positioning Using Radio 
Beacons in the Wild, Intel Research Technical Report, IRS-TR-04-016, October 2004, available at 
http://www.placelab.org. 
113 See D. Petrie, A Framework for Session Initiation Protocol User Agent Profile Delivery, IETF Document 
(work in progress), May 2004, available at draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework-03; J. Rosenberg, Indicating User 
Agent Capabilities in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), IETF Document (work in progress), January 2004, 
available at draft-ietf-sip-callee-caps-03. 
114 A user authentication capability should help prevent such problems as crank calls.  However, a failed 
authorization could result from an administrative or technical problem.  Accordingly, a response mechanism and 
an authentication policy need to be established. 
115 See e.g., http://www1.avaya.com/enterprise/whitepapers/lb1879.pdf and http://www.nena9-1-1.org/9-1-
1TechStandards/Standards_PDF/NENA_03-003.pdf. 
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Schulzrinne and Knarig Arabshian.116 In the simplest (and likely initial) 
case, the SIP elements could connect to the legacy E911 system through a 
PSTN gateway.  In this case, the SIP device would look much like other 
devices commonly attached to the PSTN (e.g., a private branch exchange, 
or PBX).  This scenario requires development of little new technology, 
though a number of existing mechanisms would need to be considered, such 
as security, availability, and routing.117 Nonetheless, a certification process 
could be useful in terms of ensuring the accuracy of location information.118 
Also, a labeling procedure could indicate any additional information that 
consumers might need.  In a second case, the PSAP would be directly 
connected to (or “aware” of) IP network traffic.  In other words, a gateway 
would not translate INVITE119 messages into PSTN signaling messages; 
therefore, the SIP session would occur between the caller and the 
emergency call center.  As a result, the caller and the emergency call center 
would be able to exchange additional information such as the patient’s 
video or healthcare data.  In this case, the routing, identification, and 
location information would probably still reside in telephone company 
databases; however, the responder could now communicate with the caller 
using a richer media capability (as a result of direct connectivity over IP, 
which is able to support multimedia communications).  In a third (long-
term) case, the routing, identification, and location information would now 
reside within the Internet, and the INVITE message would carry the traffic 
to the PSAP.  The elements within the SIP network could gather the 
appropriate routing and location information using a number of mechanisms 
(e.g., the use of DNS in mapping locations to PSAPs and emergency call 
centers).  While the details of such a process are outside the scope of this 
paper, these details may nonetheless prove extremely relevant to the 
certification mechanisms that could be deployed.  
 
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, VoIP emergency services 
could be developed by making enhancements to existing SIP-based 
networks.  The point is that these capabilities either currently exist or will 
soon exist.  The challenge now involves the actual implementation of these 
capabilities, which is where a certification process can help. 
 
116 Henning Schulzrinne & Knarig Arabshian, “Providing Emergency Services in Internet Telephony,” an 
FCC E911 Solutions Summit, March 2004. 
117 Many security and routing technologies already exist.  For example, the process of authentication and 
authorization could be based on existing mechanisms or SIP techniques and later could possibly be based on trait-
based mechanisms currently under development. 
118 As Schulzrinne describes, location information may need to be manually configured, measured by the end 
system (GPS), conveyed to the end system, or provided within the network. Id., at 29. 
119 An INVITE message is a used in SIP to serve as the mechanism for requesting a session (a call) with 
another user. 
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E.  Technology Requirements 
 
To assist in defining the characteristics of this process, we will next 
examine high-level requirements for VoIP emergency services.  We propose 
that the certification process should first support a phased implementation.  
While interim solutions are available immediately, some aspects of the 
longer-term solution will require additional technical development, further 
industry negotiations (with possible regulatory intervention), and 
considerable investment.  Therefore, as both NENA and Schulzrinne 
describe, a short-term solution—attaching IP devices to the PSTN 
emergency services in much the same way as the devices are attached to a 
PBX—should be available for certification now.  A longer-term solution—
where IP interfaces with the PSAP directly, the PSAP participates in the IP 
session, and the databases are IP accessible—should also be specified as 
soon as possible.   
 
Together with this phased approach, we propose that the technology 
specifications should support a range of technologies.  For example, a 
certification process should be developed for other IP services such as 
instant messaging or videophone.  Further, we believe that various levels of 
specification should be available within a technology.  For example, several 
levels of VoIP certification might be made available (e.g., good, better, and 
best). 
 
Below we propose a so-called straw man (a provisional, exploratory 
sketch) of the high-level specifications that might be required of a high-
quality VoIP service (a “best” service level).  Note that this service could be 
running as software, an IP phone, or another device.120 Also note that we 
focus on certifying and labeling the VoIP end device rather than the 
network. 
 
• General capability. provide information to end users through such 
means as device labeling or software notification 
 
• General capability. provide reasonable quality of service (e.g.,
meet the performance and reliability measures previously discussed) 
 
• System capability. access the emergency services infrastructure 
 
• System capability. form proper emergency services messages 
 
120 While other network requirements exist, these requirements are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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• System capability. accurately determine and communicate the 
proper location of VoIP applications and callers 
 
• End user capability. participate in an authentication process 
 
• End user capability. initiate emergency services calls using a 
recognized emergency number (e.g., 911 or SOS) 
 
• End user capability. test the emergency services applications 
 
The details of how these requirements might be assessed remain to be 
determined.  Furthermore, other requirements also warrant consideration 
(and perhaps some of the requirements listed above merit debate).  
Accordingly, we welcome comments and feedback. 
 
IV. TRENDS IN CERTIFICATION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION:
A BRIEF VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACHES 
We have briefly seen earlier in this article that Europe and the 
United States have historically taken different approaches to standardization 
and certification and that many U.S. approaches have been borrowed from 
the European tradition.  We have also seen that the United States and 
Europe are slowly harmonizing their approaches through the TCBs.  How 
might such a collaborative concept also apply to VoIP?  One way is to 
consider the best mechanism (European or American) for resolving the 
liability issues that may arise from VoIP product certification.  The United 
States offers a consumer-action-based system of legal redress that contrasts 
sharply with the preventative measures taken in the European state-based 
social system of protections.  In the United States, citizens can take legal 
action and seek punitive damages for relief if products do not perform as 
advertised or if products are defectively designed, manufactured, or labeled.  
In Europe, however, the state tends to take a more active role ex ante (i.e.,
before products are launched into the marketplace).  The European 
approach, then, is to rely on state-sponsored certification, to provide 
protections to companies that obtain such certification, and to make 
consumer remedies available only as a last recourse. 
 
Europeans tend to be more precautious ex ante than Americans, and 
they tend to turn to the state (and to organizations like ETSI) to help set 
safety guidelines.  In the case of VoIP technology, however, it is almost too 
late for European and American regulators to implement preventative 
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measures of any kind.  Any action, by definition, will be reactive. However, 
in other areas of technology—such as wireless telephony—Europeans (and 
to some extent Americans) have not hesitated to impose an oxymoronic ex 
post precautionary principle to an existing network of wireless telephones 
(the precautionary principle will be discussed in greater depth later in this 
section).121 We believe that such an ex post approach, if applied to VoIP, 
will be unsuccessful, but it may prove instructive to review some of the 
differences between European and U.S. approaches in general. As scholar 
Adam Burgess explains, 
 
Since the 1980s, Europe has increasingly established an 
identity around concern about vaguely conceived threats to 
the health of its citizens.  Unlike uncaring, free market 
America, in this scenario, “social” Europe is aware of the 
threat posed by the dangerous products of “unscrupulous” 
multinationals.122 
It is perhaps helpful to understand that Adam Burgess is a sociologist who 
recently published a book that tracks the sociological phenomenon of the 
public’s fear of phones (based on the “hysteria factor,” discussed below).123 
In the instance cited above, Burgess purposely oversimplifies the 
problem—America is not “uncaring,” and Europe’s “aware[ness] of the 
threat” does not necessarily exceed that of America.  What Burgess is 
doing, then, is making an insightful cultural point: where the United States 
tends to take an ad hoc, laissez-faire approach to consumer harms, Europe 
traditionally takes a more precautionary stance.  These markedly different 
 
121 Fears arising from mobile phones triggered protests in Italy that called for the closure of the Vatican’s 
broadcast facilities, led to the freezing of wireless deployment in Spain for nearly a year, and caused serious 3G 
deployment problems in Germany and elsewhere.  As a result, many called for the ex post application of the 
precautionary principle to broadcast emissions.  In Italy, the Vatican even turned down the emissions due to 
hysteria.  See Yaroslov Trofimov, Italians Say Potent Vatican Tower Emits Radiation That Poses Cancer Risk, 
WALL ST. J., March 27, 2001, at B7A.  Several failed U.S. cases also attempted to attach cancer liability to mobile 
phone manufacturers. See Motorola v. Ward, 478 S.E.2d. 465 (Ga. App. 1996) (rejecting a claim against a cell 
phone manufacturer for causing or exacerbating cancer, due to lack of causation and inconclusive evidence); 
Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D.Fla. 1995) (rejecting a plaintiff’s wrongful-death action for lack 
of causation and for failure of the Daubert test); Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d. 769 (D.Md. 2002) 
(rejecting a cancer claim against a cell-phone manufacturer for failure of the Daubert test); Chernock v. U.S., 718 
F.Supp. 900 (N.D.Fla. 1989) (ruling against several workers’ claims against the government for injuries allegedly 
caused by operating radar devices); and In re Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability,
248 F.Supp.2d 452 (D.Md. 2003) (preventing claims brought by five classes of phone purchasers who were not 
provided with headsets for use in guarding against possible danger, because federal law sets safety standards and 
preempts such claims). 
122 Adam Burgess, A Precautionary Tale: The British Response to Cell Phone EMF, 21 IEEE TECHNOLOGY 
AND SOCIETY 4, (2003) at 15  [hereinafter: Burgess: A Precautionary Tale]. 
123 ADAM BURGESS, CELLULAR PHONES, PUBLIC FEARS, AND A CULTURE OF PRECAUTION (Cambridge 
University Press: 2003).  Burgess seeks to explain how these fears came about in the first place—in both Europe 
and the United States—and uses a sociological lens to critique today’s precautionary climate. 
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modi operandi and their impact on certification processes cannot be 
overlooked. 
 
A.  Different Approaches to Product Liability 
 
Interestingly enough, the American and European approaches to 
liability have not always been so different, particularly since the United 
States once borrowed many of its laws from Europe.  Indeed, every first-
year American law student is familiar with a famous judgment that has had 
widespread implications on U.S. liability cases.  In 1934, Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo first articulated and then dismissed the following legal principle, 
and he did so in the same judgment: stop, look, and reconnoiter. (Cardozo 
had to first articulate the principle and then dismiss it because, in the 
tradition of common law, the higher courts have to be clear on the precedent 
before reaching a different conclusion.)  In plain English, this precept was 
originally derived from advice about stopping a car before crossing railroad 
tracks.  However, the “reconnoiter” aspect is somewhat more complicated, 
for it seemingly stipulates that a driver should stop the car, get out, inspect 
the area and look for trains (reconnoiter), get back in the car, and, assuming 
no trains are approaching, cross the tracks.  In this instance, Justice Cardozo 
noted that reconnoitering is unnecessary and quite possibly dangerous.124 In 
passing this judgment, however, Cardozo reversed an earlier decision by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who had decreed that an individual was 
obliged to get out of the vehicle and reconnoiter before crossing the 
tracks.125 Not unexpectedly, Cardozo’s reinterpretation of the “stop, look, 
and reconnoiter” provision and the greater application of that provision in 
the legal world have had a profound effect on the number of civil cases 
involving punitive damages that have been tried in the United States during 
the past seventy years.  When Cardozo declared that individuals no longer 
need to reconnoiter before crossing railroad tracks, he initiated a trend that 
eventually placed a greater burden on railroad companies, and, in turn, on 
manufacturers in general.  In short, the state would no longer expect 
individuals to take commonsense precautions to protect themselves from 
harm; instead, large companies would be held increasingly responsible for 
any damages caused by their products. 
 
124 Pokora v. Wabash Railroad Co., 54 S. Ct. 580, 583-84 (1934). Justice Cardozo explained that  
[s]tandards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken over from the 
facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre is an uncommon precaution, as everyday 
experience informs us. Besides being uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes 
even dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn 
nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets 
his car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him. 
125 Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
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Here, let us take a step back and look at the philosophical and 
linguistic underpinnings of expressions of precaution.  The phrase “stop, 
look, and reconnoiter” is composed of an unusual mixture of English (stop, 
look) and French (reconnoiter, a derivative of the French word 
reconnaître).126 Indeed, virtually all American law students have to stop, 
look, and reconnoiter—that is, find a dictionary—when they read the 
famous case, because the word reconnoiter is not commonly used in the 
English language.  Indeed, the U.S. approach to consumer protection has 
changed drastically in recent decades, as encapsulated by the multibillion-
dollar sums that tobacco plaintiffs have taken home.127 Certainly, many of 
the people who have been diagnosed with or who have died from cancer as 
a result of smoking cigarettes did reconnoiter the damage that tobacco 
causes to their lungs, and yet many of these individuals and their families 
have sought punitive damages and have been compensated accordingly for 
pain, suffering, and wrongful death by the cigarette manufacturers.  As it 
turns out, the leading U.S. cases for punitive damages have all arisen since 
the 1980s—and many have since been quashed by the Supreme Court.128 
So, returning to Adam Burgess’ quote above, even if Burgess has 
oversimplified the American and European outlooks on consumer 
protections, he is right to say that the divergence between the two world 
views was set in motion at some point in the past century, possibly even in 
1934 with Cardozo’s ruling. 
 
Thus, Americans arguably are no longer expected to reconnoiter; 
instead, large firms and multinational corporations are seemingly expected 
to shoulder the majority of consumer risk, and their perceived 
accountability for product defects and failures often translates into 
multimillion-dollar (or even multibillion-dollar) settlements.  Nonetheless, 
the essence of the “stop, look, and reconnoiter” precaution lives on in both 
American and European culture in commonplace adages such as “an ounce 
of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” “better safe than sorry,” and “look 
before you leap.”  These expressions have Dutch,129 French,130 and German 
 
126 The French word reconnaître (and its English form, reconnoiter) means to faire une reconnaissance or, 
in English, to survey and review.  THE COLLINS-ROBERT FRENCH DICTIONARY (1990). 
127 See generally Elisabeth J. Calabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive 
Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV 979 (2001) 
(surveying and discussing the tobacco claims and the multibillion-dollar settlements and awards). 
128 See generally Patrick S. Ryan, Revisiting the United States Application of Punitive Damages: Separating 
Myth from Reality, 10 ILSA J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 69 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=545243 
[describing the development of punitive damages as a tort remedy in the United States through recent (2003) U.S. 
Supreme Court cases]. 
129 The following common Dutch phrases are translated more-or-less directly: “beter voorkomen dan 
genezen” (it is better to prevent than to cure), “bezint eer ge begint” (reflect before you begin), “beter te hard 
geblazen dan de mond gebrand” (it is better to have blown too hard than to have burned your mouth), and “een 
gewaarschuwd man is er twee waard” (one warned person is worth two people). 
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equivalents,131 as well as equivalents in other languages.  The Hippocratic 
Oath, which arose out of Greece more than 2,000 years ago, has governed 
the actions of physicians for centuries,132 and it offers yet another 
interpretation of what will become known as the “precautionary principle.”  
According to the oath, each physician is instructed to “prescribe [a] regimen 
for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and 
never do harm to anyone.”  Thus, while the United States has in large part 
replaced the “stop, look, and reconnoiter” provision with a legal mechanism 
for instituting punitive damages, at one point the U.S. system much more 
clearly resembled the European system.  In tying this discussion back to the 
topic of VoIP telephony, however, we can see that neither Europe nor the 
United States has properly prepared for the new challenges that will arise 
from the proliferation of VoIP or for the difficulties involved in developing 
standards to address emergency services. 
 
B.  Technological Development Will Forge Ahead 
in the Face of (Pre)caution 
 
Internet telephony will continue to develop, and the absence of an 
industry coalition to certify and standardize products will leave an 
abundance of different standards and concomitant safety problems.  In fact, 
the market drivers for VoIP adoption are overwhelming.  For example, 
Internet telephony will enable foreigners who live in the United States to 
communicate with their loved ones in their home countries at virtually no 
cost.  Furthermore, products like KaZaA’s Skype,133 an application-layer 
terminal, are only in their infancy, and, regardless of what happens with the 
regulation of E911, these products will continue to develop and appear on 
the marketplace.  Accordingly, the time is now to develop a certification 
process that affords carriers a level of protection that they can rely on. 
 
130 The most common term in French is “il vaut mieux prévenir que guérir” (it is better to prevent than to 
heal). Such was the title of a recent article in Switzerland asserting that the precautionary principle should be 
applied to “electrosmog” and to radio emissions in general. Jürg Baumann, Smog Électrique: Mieux Vaut Prévenir 
que Gúerir, 2 ENVIRONNEMENT 1999, available at http://www.umwelt-schweiz.ch/buwal/fr/medien/umwelt/
1999_2/unterseite4/. The author says “electrosmog is omnipresent in our environment” and suggests that the 
precautionary principle should be applied in a proposed law that would greatly regulate and reduce the installation 
of new sites. 
131 The following common German phrases are translated more-or-less directly: “vorsicht ist die mutter der 
porzelankiste” (care is the mother of the box of chinaware), “vorbeugen ist besser als heilen” (prevention is better 
than cure), “man muss das uebel bei der wurzel packen” (grab evil by its roots), and “wehret den anfaengen” 
[resist the beginnings (of something bad)]. The latter two phrases, outgrowths of Nazi Germany, are often referred 
to in a political context. For a list of German aphorisms, see www.aphorismen.de.
132 The Hippocratic Oath is thought to have originated some 2,300 years ago on the Greek Island of Cos.  It 
remains today the “central document, the most often-cited summary of the physician’s own understanding of what 
is morally required to be a good medical doctor.”  David L. Katz, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death 
Row — Is Judicial Intervention Warranted? 4 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS 707, 714 (1991). 
133 See the Skype website, available at http://www.skype.com/. 
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We have already seen that inconsistent implementation of protective 
measures in different U.S. states seems to have inspired certain carriers to 
adopt subversive approaches to network deployment.  For example, in spite 
of political maneuvers undertaken to facilitate network construction,134 
vocal community protest induced companies like Omnipoint to try to build 
several hundred “stealth-antenna” sites without municipal authorization 
during the 1990s.135 In this particular case, Omnipoint may have concluded 
that the time and expense required to obtain authorization for the antennas, 
along with the ensuing public outcry, would have prevented it from 
competing successfully with existing providers who had erected antenna 
sites years prior.  Such “stealth” deployment of wireless sites is not unlike 
the phenomenon that we are now experiencing with respect to new 
companies (like Skype) that are selling application-level software for people 
to run on their PCs.  Before we know it, everyone’s computer will be 
outfitted with not one but several mechanisms that enable voice 
communications.  In the end, an industry-coordinated effort to certify these 
types of products may help to make the “stealth” and lesser-known 
solutions less attractive to consumers. 
 
C.  Government Must Respond by Encouraging Self-Regulation 
 
More and more VoIP products are deployed each day, and we will 
also have to address the certification and associated liability issues that 
inevitably will arise.  We believe that the concerted effort of various parties 
(e.g., academics, consumers, governments, and non-governmental 
organizations) will be required to ensure that the growth and deployment of 
VoIP occur in a sensible way that protects consumers by allowing them 
access to emergency services.  Moreover, even though the effort will need 
to be coordinated by these various stakeholders, industry must leap to the 
 
134 See House Report 104-204 at 95 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.A.N.N. 10, 61-62. The report reveals 
Congress’s intent to achieve national uniformity over radio frequency emissions standards and notes the interplay 
between these standards and local zoning laws:  
The [Commerce] Committee has received substantial evidence that local zoning decisions, while 
responsive to local concern about the potential effects of radio frequency emission levels, are at 
times not supported by scientific and medical evidence. A high quality national wireless 
telecommunications network cannot exist if each of its component [sic] must meet different RF 
[radio frequency] standards in each community. The Committee believes the [FCC] rulemaking 
on this issue (ET Docket 93-62) should contain adequate, appropriate and necessary levels of 
protection to the public, and needs to be completed expeditiously. 
135 See John Cichowski, Antenna Critics Demand Answers, THE RECORD [Bergen County, NJ], September 4, 
1997, at L3. Cichowski discusses Omnipoint’s arrangement with the State of New Jersey to put up 122 sites 
without municipal approval.  Because of political pressure, the New Jersey Governor stepped in to provide the 
municipalities with a veto right.  The article also discusses Omnipoint’s “stealth” erection of these sites in a 
commercial zone without first obtaining zoning approval.  Leslie Haggin, Complaints Force Down Cell Phone 
Antenna, THE RECORD [Bergen County, NJ], May 9, 1997. Haggin discusses an Omnipoint cellular phone antenna 
that was erected on the side of the Newark Pompton Turnpike without any zoning approval.  Municipal authorities 
forced the antenna to be taken down. 
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forefront of this initiative.  Along these lines, the government will have to 
abandon its attempts to control development—particularly in cases where 
development cannot be controlled—and encourage industry to collaborate 
in a self-regulatory effort. 
 
As we have already seen, the government has relaxed antitrust 
regulation to allow industry consortia to conduct joint research and 
development (through the NCRA).  This trend must continue.  In the words 
of science writer Robert Pool,  
 
[f]or better or worse, technology has changed. Our days of 
innocence, when machines were solely a product of larger-
than-life inventors and hardworking engineers, are gone.  
Increasingly, technology will be a joint effort, with its design 
shaped not only by engineers and executives but also 
psychologists, political scientists, management theorists, risk 
specialists, regulators and courts, and the general public.  It 
will not be a neat system.  It is probably not the best system.  
But, given the power and complexity of modern technology, 
it is likely our only choice.136 
Pool encourages us to embrace the future development of technologies and 
to increase our awareness of the roles and impact of these technologies.  As 
he notes, the “power and complexity of modern technology” warrant 
implementation of a proactive, multidisciplinary, cooperative approach that 
addresses the challenges of our increasingly technological world. 
 
Of course, the idea that Robert Pool’s “joint [product development] 
effort” is really our “only choice” might be challenged by some skeptics.  
However, the concept is a useful construct for the fast-changing technology 
sector, particularly in areas—like VoIP—where government regulation has 
proven that it has difficulty in keeping up with progress.  
 
D.  An Ounce of Precaution Is Better Than a Pound of Precaution, 
Particularly When the Opportunity Is Lost 
 
We have previously seen that the development of emergency 
services and wireless technologies can be analogized to the development of 
VoIP.  Europeans, for example, have attempted to apply the precautionary 
principle in wireless deployments.  Accordingly, for our purposes it might 
 
136 ROBERT POOL, BEYOND ENGINEERING: HOW SOCIETY SHAPES TECHNOLOGY (Oxford University Press, 
1997), at 305. 
44 Lookabaugh, Ryan, & Sicker [3-May-05 
be useful to briefly explore the possible application of this principle in E911 
and VoIP deployments and then dismiss that same possibility (much like 
Justice Cardozo did when he ruled that individuals may need to stop and 
look but that they do not need to reconnoiter). 
 
The precautionary principle is a powerful—but extreme—example 
of governments’ constant struggle between encouraging the development of 
new and exciting technologies and exerting control over those technologies 
so as to protect the citizenry.  In attempting to define the precautionary 
principle and bring form to its manifold vague shapes, many scholars have 
traced the roots of the principle to German law—the Vorsorgeprinzip137—
particularly in connection with environmental policy.138 The 
Vorsorgeprinzip origins of the precautionary principle are based on the 
rationale that, as Konrad von Moltke notes, “[e]nvironmental policy is not 
fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and the elimination of 
damage which has occurred.  Precautionary environmental policy requires 
furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them are 
made with care.”139 The precautionary principle finds its natural home in 
environmental law,140 but its exact meaning and the manner in which it 
should be applied elsewhere—such as to various aspects of telephony 
regulation—are subjects of great debate and controversy.141 
137 Vorsorgeprinzip, translated literally, means “foresight principle” or “forecaring principle.”  A typically 
vague clarification of what the precautionary principle means can be found in an article written by Nicola Notaro, 
Environmental Policy, in GABRIEL GLÖCKNER, ET. AL, GUIDE TO EU POLICIES (Bruges: 1998), at 229 
[hereinafter: Notaro, Environmental Policy].  The author notes that the precautionary principle is part of European 
law and draws a connection between the principle and the Vorsorgeprinzip, though he stops short of any 
meaningful discussion of its meaning.  His entire discussion of the precautionary principle is as follows: 
[The] precautionary principle was added to the [Treaty of the European Union] and stems from 
German environmental law where it is known as the Vorsorgeprinzip.  The principle is that 
whenever there is a strong suspicion that a certain activity may have environmentally harmful 
consequences, it is better to act before the damage occurs rather than wait for incontrovertible 
scientific evidence. 
138 See Katherine Barrett & Joel Tickner, Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Briefing Paper on the 
Precautionary Principle, Working Paper of the University of Massachusetts Lowell Center for Sustainable 
Production, April 23, 2001. The authors discuss the origins of the Vorsorgeprinzip, associating it with the modern 
precautionary principle, and attribute its origins to a West German movement during the early 1970s. The authors 
emphasize, however, that the meaning of the term has changed since the 1970s: “It is critical to note that the 
Germans viewed Vorsorge as a means of stimulating innovation and social planning for sustainability, rather than 
simply a tool to block potentially dangerous activities.”  Id., at 1. 
139 Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, in TWELFTH REPORT:
BEST PRACTICAL CONTROL OPTIONS (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1988), at 3. 
140 See Notaro, Environmental Policy, cited supra at note 137 (discussing the precautionary principle in the 
context of European environmental policy).  
141 See e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L REV. 1003 (2003) 
[hereinafter: Sunstein, Precautionary Principle].  Professor Sunstein is a heavy critic of the principle.  Sunstein 
“challenge[s] the precautionary principle here, not because it leads in bad directions, but because, read for all that 
it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. The principle threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction, 
and every step in between.” 
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Scholars have invested great time and energy in investigating the 
origins of the precautionary principle and its application to science.142 
While it is correct to credit Germany with the principle’s metamorphosis 
into a legal norm, it is perhaps more useful to recognize the principle’s 
more general derivation. Simply put, the precautionary principle is—at 
best—just a principle. Thus, the principle is not law, even if it is mentioned 
in the Treaty for the European Union and other international laws in the 
United States, Germany, and elsewhere.143 Kenneth Foster, for one, has 
examined the precautionary principle as it specifically applies (or could 
apply) to mobile phones.  Foster, an international expert on the effects of 
wireless signals on human safety, has reached the following conclusions: 
 
The Precautionary Principle is not a scientific proposition, 
nor is it a precisely defined proposition in international law; 
there is some question whether it even qualifies as being a 
“principle” at all.  Rather, it is a counsel for risk aversion,
expressed in varying ways in numerous treaties and other 
documents.  In practice, its application is constrained by 
policies, statutes and case law of individual states and 
international law.144 
Indeed, as Foster has suggested, the precautionary principle is no more than 
“counsel for risk aversion,” the kind that can be found both in our legal 
systems and in everyday aphorisms (e.g., “better safe than sorry”).  So, 
while it may be helpful for lawyers to take note of the German movement 
that incorporated the Vorsorgeprinzip into environmental law in the 1970s 
and 1980s, it is somewhat shortsighted to draw wide-ranging conclusions 
from the German movement. 
 
Thus, though we have gained a greater understanding of the origins 
of the precautionary principle, we are nonetheless left with the following 
questions: Should precautions, or, more specifically, the precautionary 
principle, be applied to mobile phone safety?  To Internet telephony?  The 
answer to these questions—deceptively—is both yes and no. As might be 
expected, the general confusion as to how to apply the principle only 
 
142 Id. (noting the German origins of the precautionary principle). 
143 See e.g., the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 1987, 26 
I.L.M. 1550, 1551 (applying the precautionary principle by treaty to the ozone layer); UNECD Text on Protection 
of Oceans, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sessions, UN Coc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.21 (1991) (applying the precautionary 
principle by international treaty to the coast); and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, January 29, 2000, 29 I.L.M. 1027, 1031 (2000) (applying the precautionary principle 
generally to living organisms). 
144 Kenneth R. Foster, “Can Electromagnetic Fields Trigger the Precautionary Principle?” Presentation at the 
WHO/NIEHS/EC Conference on the Precautionary Principle, Luxembourg, February 2003, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
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increases when it is applied within the context of telephony and the different 
technologies associated with it.145 Naturally, we should be cautious, even 
precautious, about products on the marketplace.  However, the 
precautionary principle should not be applied as a matter of law, if for no 
other reason than the fact that it is not law.  Accordingly, as we turn to our 
proposed model for regulation, we wish to emphasize that the unfortunate 
alternative to a self-regulatory certification process may be the largely 
unproductive ex post application of precaution through some form of the 
precautionary principle. 
 
V. A PROPOSED MODEL 
In this section, we will present a specific institutional framework 
and a set of summary technical criteria and procedure recommendations in 
order to provide a concrete model of a capability for emergency services 
self-regulation and certification.  We recognize that other models could be 
developed.  However, this proposed model represents our best 
recommendation based on our current information and understanding. 
 
A.  Institutional Design 
 
Here we refine the general observations of Section III into the 
following recommendation: 
 
Government agencies should perform some initial coordination 
between federal and state levels and then publicize a consistent 
and credible statement of intent to regulate VoIP emergency 
services unless credible self-regulation emerges.  At the same 
time, government agencies should move to facilitate successful 
self-regulation, as described below. 
 
1. Industry Should Organize 
 
Industry service and equipment providers should form an 
organization to pursue VoIP emergency services.  Such an organization 
could be a derivative of an existing industry trade association or 
consortium, and it should have the following characteristics:  (1) It should 
be funded by and heavily involve industry participants, (2) it should remain 
intentionally open and transparent to all industry participants and other 
stakeholders, particularly regulators and consumer interest groups (such 
arrangements should be codified in the organization’s bylaws), and (3) it 
 
145 See Burgess, A Precautionary Tale, cited supra at note 122, at 15. 
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should develop standards, as well as update and extend them.  Traditional 
open standards bodies such as IETF, the ISO, and the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) can serve as models.  Although the body would 
initially focus on emergency services, it could eventually embrace other 
social policy self-regulation goals as well.146 This organization should also 
do the following: create a brand around the certification, establish the 
appropriate legal protections, act as a co-sponsor with the government to 
promote public awareness of the certification, maintain a database of 
accreditations, and police accreditations.  The standardization activity 
would draw on the momentum built by the Voice on the Net (VON) 
Coalition, an alliance between NENA and several VoIP industry 
participants.  The VON Coalition is described in more detail on the 
following pages. 
 
2. A Separation of Powers Should Be Established 
 
While organizing industry into consortia for appropriate standards-
setting efforts is a great start, we believe an additional step is needed.  In 
particular, the process should not be held captive to the interests of certified 
parties.  Concretely, we recommend implementation of two specific 
“separation of power” elements in order to enhance the credibility of the 
process.  First, multiple independent and competitive testing organizations 
should perform accreditation.  Furthermore, either these organizations or 
third parties should provide pre-certification consulting and training.  
Second, these testing organizations should be accredited by a third party, 
distinct from both the standards-setting and certification branding 
organization and from the testing organizations.  The two major candidates 
for this role are a government agency and an independent institution (e.g., a
respected neutral institution such as ANSI).  
 
3. Industry and Government Should Work Hand in Hand 
 
In order to facilitate these ends, government agencies should appoint 
personnel to assist in the formation of the self-regulation process as follows:  
 
• Credibly transmit the threat of government regulation if self-
regulation fails. 
 
146 We would not expect the motivation for new social policy goals to arise naturally from the industry 
participants in this organization.  As we have indicated elsewhere, an external motivation is needed.  Most likely, 
such a motivation would come in the form of a public debate culminating in a credible threat of government 
intervention.  The close coordination with government that we are proposing could facilitate the efficient signaling 
of such events. 
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• Report back to the government the level of progress made. 
 
• Ensure agency experts provide input into certification standards and 
process design. 
 
• Promote self-regulation elsewhere in government by recognizing 
self-regulatory efforts as mitigating factors in punitive proceedings. 
 
• Educate users about certification (both industry and government 
should cosponsor this goal). 
 
• Work with the telecommunications industry in order to incorporate 
the insurance industry in the process and clarify the level of liability 
mitigation (beyond government liability mitigation) provided to 
those who diligently certify products. 
 
• Liaise with other interested government parties (e.g., Congress). 
 
Although the preceding responsibilities will require significant 
effort, their implementation will require dramatically less effort than that 
required to create and execute government command-and-control 
regulation.  That said, it should be clear that we are by no means advocating 
a passive government role. 
 
B.  Technical Approach 
 
Ideally, this transition to an IP-based emergency services solution 
should not burden future models with legacy assumptions.  The design, 
function, and operation of the Internet provide an abundant set of possible 
solutions, and policy addressing future emergency services should embrace 
this flexibility and optimize the potential social benefits.  The policy thus 
(1) should not restrict the manner in which a function is provided, 
(2) should support multiple implementation methods, (3) should encourage 
the incorporation of emergency services into other technologies, and 
(4) should encourage developers to create cheaper, better, and more feature-
rich technologies. 
 
Certification will likely need to include both certification of 
terminals (which can potentially be transported to a test site) and 
certification of network characteristics (which cannot).  In this paper, we 
focus only on the former, mainly because it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
exhaustively test all network nodes and usage combinations as a part of 
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certification.  With these thoughts in mind, we suggest that network testing 
use a meta-standard style process certification focused on (1) the way in 
which the network is designed and managed to maintain an emergency 
services capability and (2) random performance testing of particular nodes 
and situations.   
 
We expect that the diversity of possible VoIP systems will preclude 
the possibility of certification to a single level of performance.  We also 
believe that this diversity should be encouraged.  Consequently, we propose 
that different levels of capability be certified, keeping in mind that the 
number of levels needs to be small enough that consumers can distinguish 
them.  VoIP systems might, for example, have two certification levels: a 
carrier grade level (with significant requirements) and a non-carrier grade 
level (with less strenuous requirements).  
 
As part of our proposed implementation plan, we recommend the 
use of the stages suggested in the NENA/VON Coalition initial agreement 
on VoIP emergency services.147 These stages, or phases, are as follows: 
 
• Phase One Certification (based on the NENA/VON Coalition 
“interim solution”) 
—Deliver a 911 call through the existing 911 network 
—Provide a callback number to PSAP  
—Provide initial location information to PSAP (optional) 
 
• Phase Two Certification (based on the NENA/VON Coalition “long-
term solution”) 
—Deliver a 911 call through an IP network to an IP-connected 
PSAP (or through an existing 911 network if PSAP is not IP-
connected) 
—Provide a callback number/recontact information to PSAP 
—Provide caller location information to PSAP 
 
This phased approach enables near-immediate implementation of 
emergency services.  It also encourages a move away from traditional 
emergency services toward a more competitive environment.   
 
147 The VON Coalition Initial Agreement, December 2003, available at http://www.nena9-1-
1.org/VoIP_IP/VOIP-NENA%20Actual%20Agreement.pdf.  Note that this agreement was reached by the 
following industry participants: 8x8, AT&T Consumer Services, BroadSoft, Dialpad, ITXC, Level 3 
Communications LLC, Level 3 Enhanced Services, PointOne, pulver.com, VON Coalition, Vonage, and Webley. 
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C.  Labeling 
 
Throughout this paper, we have noted that labeling could be an 
important aspect of the certification process.  While the details of such a 
mechanism warrant a separate analysis, here we briefly propose a labeling 
initiative, discuss its merits, and provide suggestions regarding the manner 
in which it might be used. 
 
We envision that labeling might include such concrete (and diverse) 
elements as (1) an identifiable sticker attached to IP phones showing the 
name of the certifying organization and the address of a website that 
provides certification details and updates, (2) a software window that 
periodically reminds users of emergency services specifications (possibly 
when the device or software detects some configuration change), and/or 
(3) an email sent to the user when the network detects a change in its 
configuration.   
 
By tying the operation of the label to system changes, the label 
becomes a dynamic mechanism that could become very useful in situations 
when the network and the device cannot automate the proper operation of 
the emergency services system (i.e., when a user might need to intervene).  
Lastly, considering the litigious nature of our society, labeling likely 
provides some legal protection to the VoIP service or software provider.   
 
In sum, labeling could be used to provide users with information 
about the (1) availability or lack of emergency services support, 
(2) emergency services limitations, (3) configuration requirements, 
(4) configuration changes, and (5) alternative methods of summoning help. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the telecommunications industry has proven adept at self-
regulating in areas of interoperability, social policy regulation has 
historically been the purview of the government.  The diversity engendered 
through the transition to VoIP will challenge such command-and-control 
regulatory policies, and we believe the time has come to consider the 
alternative of social policy self-regulation.  We recognize the key challenges 
that arise from a self-regulatory process, but we believe that the framework 
we have recommended can succeed.  Success in this area would not only 
provide substantial value in the case of VoIP emergency services, but it 
would also add a vital new regulatory approach for use within the 
telecommunications industry, which continues to evolve rapidly. 
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VoIP technology enables a much broader range of technical and 
business approaches than were feasible in the PSTN world.  On the one 
hand, this new technical reality heralds a new era of innovation and 
flexibility for users, while on the other hand it makes difficult (or, more 
likely, impossible) the task of mapping traditional social policy goals and 
constructs from the PSTN world to the VoIP world in a straightforward 
manner.  We will want to preserve many current social policy goals in one 
form or another, as well as consider new policy goals over time.  With these 
thoughts in mind, it seems we would be well-served by a more flexible, 
rapid, and innovative method of mapping such goals onto the increasingly 
heterogeneous world of telecommunications. 
 
Emergency services are a critically important and immediate case in 
point.  Traditional emergency services expectations include connection of 
timely, highly intelligible emergency calls with the appropriate answering 
point and communication of critical information regarding the call’s place 
of origin (both as a network address and as a physical location).  The variety 
of VoIP implementations makes these expectations intrinsically difficult to 
meet.  Thus, we propose that industry should design—using input from the 
government and other stakeholders—a multi-tier certification scheme that 
will provide a VoIP emergency services capability that can fully satisfy 
these expectations.  We expect the certification regime to focus on several 
key technical characteristics of VoIP systems, including addressing, routing, 
location, security, availability, and related network and application 
standards. 
 
Our analysis is not complete in some important respects.  From the 
technology perspective, we would like to further develop a broad set of 
technology categories that might be based on media type, network access, 
user expectations, or some other criteria.  Within these categories, we would 
define a set of characteristics upon which a certification process could be 
applied (as we have done above for VoIP).  While we have performed some 
basic legal analysis and inquiry into the role of standardization and 
consortia in institutional design, we believe that more research is needed in 
this area.  We have not considered, for example, how social policy funding 
will be affected by the transition to VoIP (e.g., telecommunications industry 
taxation helps to fund public safety, and it will be important to determine if 
these obligations will be transferred to VoIP or if they will be covered in 
some other way).  Finally, we briefly discussed the importance of 
developing different categories of VoIP implementations against which 
different certification standards might be developed.  We believe further 
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investigation could allow this approach to expand to include other types of 
media over IP (e.g., instant messages and video).  
 
Finally, our proposed model needs both refinement and assessment.  For 
our part, we have evaluated the model by performing critical and 
documented analysis of internal integrity and credibility with respect to 
successful precedents and by disseminating this analysis to policy-oriented 
audiences for critique and debate (as we have done with our submission of a 
preliminary version of this paper to the Telecommunications Policy 
Research Conference.)148 Moreover, we have used the analysis from 
sections II and III to demonstrate the validity of our approach.  For the 
longer term, we derived this analysis through the use of our particular 
model, as well as through our execution of specific strategies for assessing 
that model once it is implemented.  As part of our strategy, we (1) 
monitored elements that evolved beyond the scope of our technical and 
business model, (2) tracked specific performance metrics of certified 
processes and compared that data against criteria derived from consumer 
expectations and social policy goals, and (3) compared voluntary adoption 
rates of certification against a template derived from our experience in 
industry-sponsored certification processes.  This longer-term assessment 
represents an ongoing effort that can benefit greatly from reader feedback.  
To that end, we welcome comments. 
 
148 See www.tprc.org. 
